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Abstract
My dissertation studies the relations between macroeconomic quantities and asset prices.
The first chapter takes a production-based approach and investigates how different types of
business investment are linked to stock returns. The second chapter takes a consumption-
based approach and investigates how the interaction between limited enforcement and pref-
erence heterogeneity affects individual consumption, risk sharing and asset prices.
In Chapter One “Capital heterogeneity, time-to-build, and return predictability”, I study
how two major types of business investment, equipment and structures, are differently linked
to stock returns. I empirically show that the investment rate of equipment has a significantly
stronger predictive power for stock returns than the investment rate of structures, both in-
sample and out-of-sample, using US aggregate-, US asset-, US industry-, and UK aggregate-
level data. To explain this empirical finding, I build a quantitative general equilibrium
production model in which it takes a shorter time-to-build for equipment investment than
for structures investment to transform into productive capital. In the model, equipment
investment reacts to productivity shocks in a more timely manner, and thus it reflects more
of the information contained in stock prices. In addition, the model provides theoretical
support for previous empirical findings of return predictability from planned investment.
In Chapter Two “Asset pricing and risk sharing with limited enforcement and heteroge-
neous preferences”, I introduce heterogeneous preferences (heterogeneity in risk aversion and
time discount factor) into a two-agent endowment economy with enforcement constraints
and aggregate and idiosyncratic income risk (Alvarez and Jermann (2001)), and study the
corresponding asset pricing and risk sharing implications. I show that the relative time
discount factor and the interaction between heterogeneous risk aversion and aggregate risk
affect the evolution of the relative Pareto weight of agents over time. I demonstrate that
preference heterogeneity can generate a positive equity premium with only idiosyncratic
risk present, since the conditional pricing kernel is time-varying depending on which agent
is the marginal pricer. I use a recursive Lagrangian method to solve a calibrated model
and show that preference heterogeneity boosts the mean and volatility of equity premium
quantitatively, when the more risk averse and/or the more patient agent cannot trade away





List of Tables v
List of Figures vi
1 Capital Heterogeneity, Time-To-Build, and Return Predictability 1
1.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
1.2 Empirical Evidence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
1.2.1 Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
1.2.2 Descriptive Statistics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
1.2.3 Direct Evidence of TTB . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
1.2.4 Empirical Specifications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
1.2.5 Empirical Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
1.2.6 Linking Time Series and Cross Section . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
1.3 Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
1.3.1 Economic Environment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
1.3.2 Investment Q and Asset Prices . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
1.4 Quantitative Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
1.4.1 Calibration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
1.4.2 Model Statistics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
1.4.3 Model Discussion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
1.4.4 Predictions on Cross-Correlations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
1.4.5 Predictions on Return Predictability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
1.4.6 Model Mechanism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
1.4.7 Planned Investment and Return Predictability . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
1.4.8 Discount Rates versus Cash Flows . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
iii
1.5 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
2 Asset Pricing and Risk Sharing with Limited Enforcement and Hetero-
geneous Preferences 62
2.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62
2.2 Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67
2.2.1 Environment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67
2.2.2 Promised Utility Formulation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68
2.2.3 Risk Sharing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71
2.2.4 Recursive Lagrangian Formulation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73
2.2.5 Computation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75
2.2.6 Decentralization and Asset Prices . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76
2.3 Two-state Example . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 78
2.4 Quantitative Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 80
2.4.1 Calibration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 80
2.4.2 Heterogeneous Risk Aversion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 80
2.4.3 Heterogeneous Time Preference . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 82
2.4.4 Asset Pricing Moments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83
2.5 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 86
Bibliography 97
Appendix A. Chapter 1 Appendices 113
A.1 The Construction Length of Time . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 113
A.2 Alternative Construction of Investment Rates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 114
A.3 UK Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 115
A.4 Firm Value Derivation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 116
A.5 Additional Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 118
Appendix B. Chapter 2 Appendices 123
B.1 Computation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 123
B.2 Calibration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 125
iv
List of Tables
1.1 Descriptive Statistics for Investment Rates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
1.2 Cross-Correlations between Investment and TFP, GDP . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
1.3 Length of Time (in Months) for Private Nonresidential Construction Projects,
by Value and Type of Construction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
1.4 Return Predictability from Aggregate Investment Rates . . . . . . . . . . . 51
1.5 Return Predictability from Aggregate Investment Rates with Time-Varying
Depreciation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52
1.6 Return Predictability from Asset-Level Investment Rates . . . . . . . . . . 53
1.7 Return Predictability from Industry Investment Rates at 5-year Horizon . . 54
1.8 Return Predictability from UK Aggregate Investment Rates . . . . . . . . . 55
1.9 Factor Predictability at 5-year Horizon from Aggregate Investment Rates . 56
1.10 Calibration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57
1.11 Model Statistics for Macro Quantities and Asset Prices . . . . . . . . . . . . 58
1.12 Return Predictability from Model-implied Investment Rates . . . . . . . . . 59
1.13 Return Predictability from Model-Implied Planned Investment . . . . . . . 60
1.14 VAR Analysis: Discount Rates versus Cash Flows . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61
2.1 SDF and Returns Across States: Heterogeneous v.s. Homogeneous Prefer-
ences . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93
2.2 Moments for Asset Pricing and Risk Sharing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 94
2.3 Moments under Independent Risk . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 95
2.4 Moments under Positive Assets . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 96
A.1 Return Predictability from Private Investment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 121
A.2 Return Predictability from Government Investment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 122
B.1 Parameter Values . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 126
v
List of Figures
1.1 Quarterly Investment Rates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
1.2 Quarterly Cross-Correlations between Investment Growth Rates and TFP
Growth Rate . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
1.3 Actual and Predicted 5-year Risk Premium . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
1.4 Model-Implied Investment and TFP Cross-Correlations . . . . . . . . . . . 45
1.5 Model Impulse Responses to TFP Shocks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
2.1 Consumption Share in the Two-state Example: Homogeneous γ vs. Hetero-
geneous γ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87
2.2 Consumption Share in the Two-state Example: Homogeneous β vs. Hetero-
geneous β . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 88
2.3 Risk Sharing: Heterogeneous vs. Homogeneous Risk Aversion . . . . . . . . 89
2.4 Asset Prices: Heterogeneous vs. Homogeneous Risk Aversion . . . . . . . . 90
2.5 Risk Sharing: Heterogeneous vs. Homogeneous Time Discount Factor . . . 91
2.6 Asset Prices: Heterogeneous vs. Homogeneous Time Discount Factor . . . . 92
A.1 Impulse Response Functions (IRFs) of Investment Growth to TFP Growth







Neoclassical theory of investment suggests that when discount rates fall, the marginal benefit
of investing increases, and thus real investment should rise.1 This implies that aggregate
investment should negatively predict future stock market returns (e.g., Cochrane (1991)).
This negative prediction may become weak if there are investment lags (e.g., delivery lag,
planning lag, or construction lag), since in that case aggregate investment will not change
immediately when discount rates change. However, the components of aggregate investment
are heterogeneous in investment lags. Investment types with shorter lags could, potentially,
still respond quickly to changes in discount rates and preserve the strong negative predictions
for future stock market returns.
In this paper, I study how differently the two major types of business investment, equip-
ment (e.g., machines) and structures (e.g., factories), are associated with future stock market
returns. It is widely believed that structures investment requires a longer time to complete
1For surveys in investment, see Jorgenson (1971), Abel (1990b), Chirinko (1993), Caballero (1999), and
Bond and Van Reenen (2007).
1
than equipment investment: It takes about two years to plan and build a manufacturing
plant, and only one to two quarters to deliver industrial equipment. This shorter investment
lag could tie equipment investment more closely than structures investment to future stock
market returns.
Using aggregate investment data from the US Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA), I
find that the investment rate of equipment predicts future stock market returns significantly
better than the investment rate of structures, both in-sample and out-of-sample. The 20-
quarter prediction R2, for equipment versus structures, is 39% versus 8% in-sample and 35%
versus negative out-of-sample. Also the prediction coefficient is significantly negative for
equipment, and negative but insignificant for structures. This stronger predicting power of
equipment is further borne out by disaggregated US asset- and industry-level data, and UK
aggregate-level data. Disaggregated US investment data reveal an interesting phenomena:
Assets with long investment lags, such as structures investment in petroleum and natural
gas and in railroad transportation, could even display positive prediction coefficients for
future stock market returns.
Equipment investment and structures investment also show different patterns of business
cycle fluctuations. Equipment investment comoves with total factor productivity (TFP), but
structures investment lags TFP for four quarters.2 This suggests that equipment investment
responds to TFP fluctuations more quickly than structures. Fluctuations in TFP are a key
underlying economic force for movements in discount rates. In good economic times, TFP
is high and aggregate risk is low, and vice versa. Thus, the quicker response of equipment
investment to TFP fluctuations could lead to equipment’s tighter linkage to future stock
market returns.
To verify this, I build a general equilibrium production model with TFP shock as the
driving force of the economic fluctuations. I use a time-to-build (TTB) specification (Kyd-
land and Prescott (1982)) from macro literature to capture investment lags. The key model
assumption is that structures investment has a longer TTB than equipment investment (5
quarters for structures versus 1 quarter for equipment), with most resources required in
later stages or so-called time-to-plan (TTP; see Christiano and Todd (1996)). In the model,
2Structures investment also lags GDP more quarters than equipment investment does.
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in addition to the difference in TTB, equipment is different from structures in several other
respects. Equipment depreciates faster,3 has a higher factor share in aggregate production,4
and has a potentially different adjustment cost.5,6 The model can generate the comovement
between equipment investment and TFP and the lagging behavior of structures investment
to TFP, as in the data. The model also produces the stronger power of equipment invest-
ment than structures investment for predicting future stock returns, consistent with this
paper’s main empirical finding. I show that only heterogeneous TTB, among all of the
heterogeneities, is necessary for these model predictions.
The model works as follows. When a positive TFP shock hits the economy, equipment
investment and the stock price increase immediately, and the expected stock return falls.
But due to TTB along with TTP, structures investment has small increases initially and
big rises in later periods. The delayed response of structures investment results in its
lagging behavior to TFP. It also causes its weaker performance for return prediction, because
today’s structures investment has not fully absorbed the good news already reflected in stock
markets.
The model produces satisfactory macro quantities and asset prices. Consumption is less
volatile than output, while investment fluctuates much more than output. The equity risk
premium is high and volatile (4.28% mean and 15.01% volatility for unlevered returns). To
achieve this good fit, I have followed Chen (2017) and introduced external habit preference
(Campbell and Cochrane (1999)) and high capital adjustment costs into the model. Since
external habit preference gives rise to large fluctuations in discount rates, a positive TFP
shock in the model acts, essentially, as a negative discount rate shock. When a positive TFP
3The slower depreciation of structures is positively related to its longer TTB, as stated in Prescott
(2016), as follows: “Stocks of capital lagged output, with the lag increasing with the durability of the
capital. Inventory stock was almost contemporaneous, producer durables stocks lagged a few quarters, and
structures lagged a couple of years”.
4See Valentinyi and Herrendorf (2008).
5Israelsen (2010) uses GMM estimation and finds a higher adjustment cost curvature for equipment than
structures. The opposite is assumed in the calibration in Jermann (2010).
6There are other differences between equipment and structures that I do not model. Equipment invest-
ment has higher tax benefits (House and Shapiro (2008)); the relative price of equipment investment to
consumption has been declining, while the relative price of structures investment to consumption has been
increasing (Greenwood et al. (1997); Jones (2016)); equipment capital complements skilled labor, which
structures capital substitutes for (Krusell et al. (2000)); equipment investment contributes to economic
growth more (De Long and Summers (1991)); equipment can be either purchased from abroad or produced
domestically, while structures cannot be purchased from abroad (House et al. (2017)).
3
shock hits the economy, the stock price and stock return rise on impact, but the dividend
falls. The future stock price has to fall to accommodate the fall in the dividend. To verify
this mechanism more formally, I follow Campbell and Shiller (1988) and decompose the
dividend-price ratio into discount rates (long-run stock returns) and cash flows (long-run
dividend growth). By using VAR (vector autoregression) analysis, I find that discount
rates indeed drive almost all of the variation in the dividend-price ratio in the model. This
confirms that the return predictability from investment in the model comes from discount
rate variations as in the data.7
The model assumption of longer TTB in structures than equipment is consistent with
the empirical evidence. First, this assumption produces the right lead-lag relations between
investment and TFP, as in the data. The 5-quarter TTB for structures gives rise to the 4-
quarter lag of structures investment to TFP, while the 1-quarter TTB for equipment causes
equipment investment to comove with TFP. Second, this assumption is consistent with direct
evidence from economic surveys. Using the Census Bureau’s Survey of Manufacturers’
Shipments, Inventories, and Orders, Jones and Tuzel (2013a) show that the delivery lag
(approximated by the ratio of unfilled orders to shipments) is about 2-6 months for durable
equipment.8 Based on the Census Bureau’s Survey of Construction Spending, also known
as the Value of Construction Put in Place Survey, Montgomery (1995) finds that the value-
weighted construction length of time for nonresidential structures projects is 16.7 months
over the period 1961-1991. I update this statistic and find that the construction length is
13.6 months over the sample 2001-2015.9
7TFP drives both discount rates and cash flows in the model. Hypothetically, it is possible that cash flows
drive the variation in the dividend-price ratio and correlate negatively with discount rates. High investment
today that predicts lower future discount rates is simply a manifestation for predicting higher future cash
flow growth.
8In detail, the delivery lags are 1.99, 2.44, 3.28, 2.93, and 6.22 months, respectively, for primary metal,
fabricated metal, industrial machinery, electronic equipment, and transportation equipment.
9For further evidence of TTB, Mayer (1960) finds that the average time for nonresidential structures
between the decision to undertake the project and the completion of construction is 7 quarters. Jorgenson
and Stephenson (1967) find the investment lag to be 6 to 12 quarters for manufacturing industries. Koeva
(2000) uses Lexis-Nexis news data and finds Compustat firms’ plant construction time to be around 2 years in
most industries. Lettau and Ludvigson (2002) find indirect evidence for investment lags from the prediction
patterns of risk premium proxies for investment growth across horizons. For further evidence of longer TTB
for structures than equipment, Abel and Blanchard (1988) find that it takes on average 1 year to build an
industrial structure, while it takes about 6 months to receive equipment. Boca et al. (2008) use a panel
of Italian firms to estimate a structural heterogeneous TTB model and find that TTB for equipment is 4
quarters, while TTB for structures is 2 to 3 years.
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This paper provides theoretical support for previous empirical findings of return pre-
dictability from planned investment, as in Lamont (2000) and Jones and Tuzel (2013b).10
In the model, although the structures investment expenditure does not predict returns, the
structures investment decision or planned structures investment does predict. Consistent
with Lamont (2000), both the growth of planned structures investment and the planned
structures investment rate negatively predict future market returns. I also construct the
ratio of planned structures investment to structures investment expenditure analogous to
Jones and Tuzel (2013b)’s ratio of nonresidential building starts to structures investment
expenditure (Starts/SI). I find that my ratio shows the highest predicting R2 for annual
market returns. However, Starts/SI displays large predicting power at long horizons from
5 to 7 years. This difference could be due to the inclusion of government structures in-
vestment in Starts/SI. Belo and Yu (2013) show that government investment is negatively
correlated with private investment and positively predicts future market returns. Further
decomposition of government investment into equipment and structures shows that equip-
ment predicts returns positively at all horizons, while structures predicts negatively at long
horizons. Thus, it is possible that government structures counteracts the negative prediction
of private structures at short horizons, but reinforces it at long horizons.11
This paper contributes to the asset pricing literature that studies the heterogeneities
between equipment and structures. Tuzel (2010) emphasizes the slower depreciation of
structures than equipment and shows that firms with more real estate holdings suffer more
from bad productivity shocks and are riskier on average. Jermann (2010) and Israelsen
(2010) model equipment and structures as two types of capital with different prices, ad-
justment costs, and depreciation rates, and investigate asset valuations from the producer’s
first-order conditions. This paper concentrates on another dimension of heterogeneity, i.e.,
TTB, and studies its implications for asset prices and economic fluctuations. In particular,
I find that TTB reduces the elasticity of structures-capital supply and dampens the fluctua-
tion in structures investment. Thus, we do not necessarily need a higher capital adjustment
10A recent paper by Li et al. (2017) shows that a bottom-up measure of aggregate investment plans also
predicts future stock market returns.
11In addition, the strong positive prediction of government equipment for returns could also contaminate
Jones and Tuzel (2013b)’s new orders to shipment ratio (NO/S), which shows predictability only at short
horizons up to 1 year.
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cost for structures, as in Tuzel (2010), to match the lower volatility of structures investment,
compared to equipment. In fact, equipment and structures have the same adjustment cost
in my benchmark calibration, while their volatilities are well matched to data.
This paper contributes to the literature on the implications of TTB for macro quantities
and asset prices. Kydland and Prescott (1982) is the first to show that TTB plays an
important role in shaping business cycle fluctuations. Altuğ (1993) shows that when there
is TTB, the marginal investment q does not equal the average investment q.12 A closely
related paper is Kuehn (2009). Kuehn brings TTB to asset pricing and demonstrates that
TTB can explain the negative correlation between investment growth and stock returns as
found in the data.13 In Kuehn’s model, there is a single type of capital with two-period
TTB, and utility is constant relative risk aversion (CRRA), which does not generate a large
enough risk premium. My model is more complex with two types of capital, more periods
of TTB, and external habit preference. It generates realistic asset prices and is suitable for
running the return predictability tests I focus on. In addition, as noted in Rouwenhorst
(1991), the impulse responses to TFP shocks oscillate for a TTB model with a single type
of capital and no adjustment costs. This is inconsistent with the empirical evidence. Kuehn
shows that adding investment adjustment cost can make the impulse responses become
smooth, but adding capital adjustment cost does not work. However, in my model, even
when there is no adjustment cost, the impulse responses are smooth due to the assumption
of two types of capital. Equipment with the standard 1-quarter TTB can absorb TFP
shocks upfront. The supply of overall capital (equipment plus structures) is elastic in the
short run, although the supply of structures capital is not. The assumption of a single type
of capital also leads to a counterfactual negative correlation between consumption growth
and investment growth when TTP is strong in Kuehn’s model. However, my model still
produces a positive correlation as in the data, since equipment investment comoves with
consumption.
12For other TTB implications in macro literature, see Altuğ (1989), Rouwenhorst (1991), Christiano and
Todd (1996), Wen (1998), Zhou (2000), Gomme et al. (2001), Christiano and Vigfusson (2003), Millar (2005),
Casares (2006), Edge (2007), Lucca (2007), Kalouptsidi (2014), Bornstein et al. (2017), among others.
13In addition, Chen (2016) demonstrates that TTB generates procyclical dividends and increases the risk
premium. TTB has also been applied to studies of capital structure and investment-cash flow sensitivity.
Tsyplakov (2008) finds that smaller firms have longer TTB and may explain the leverage differences between
small and large firms. Tsoukalas (2011) shows that TTB helps to explain investment-cash flow sensitivity.
6
This paper also contributes to the literature that links investment to stock returns (see
Kogan and Papanikolaou (2012) and Zhang (2017) for an overview). Cochrane (1991) shows
that the stock return should equal the investment return (see also Restoy and Rockinger
(1994)) and finds empirical support in aggregate time-series data. Cochrane (1996) tests
aggregate investment growth as a risk factor for the cross section of stock returns. Liu et al.
(2009) extend Cochrane (1991) to test the equivalence between the stock return and the
investment return at the level of individual firms, and find some supporting evidence. The
literature of cross sectional asset pricing has shown that firms with high investment today
have lower subsequent average stock returns (see portfolio sorts on growth in investment-
sales ratio in Titman et al. (2004), on investment growth in Anderson and Garcia-Feijóo
(2006), on investment rate in Xing (2007), on asset growth in Cooper et al. (2008), on
inventory growth in Belo and Lin (2011), and on investment rate in brand capital in Belo
et al. (2014b)).14 Hou et al. (2015) and Fama and French (2016) include an investment
factor in their four-factor and five-factor asset pricing models, respectively, to explain the
wide range of cross-sectional asset pricing anomalies. In addition, a strand of literature on
production-based asset pricing models—in either general-equilibrium approach or partial-
equilibrium approach with an exogenously specified stochastic discount factor—studies how
firms’ investment decisions affect the cross-section of stock returns. An incomplete list
of contributions include Berk et al. (1999), Kogan (2001), Gomes et al. (2003), Carlson
et al. (2004), Kogan (2004), Zhang (2005), Cooper (2006), Ai and Kiku (2013), Kogan and
Papanikolaou (2013), and Kogan and Papanikolaou (2014). Also, several papers, namely
Cochrane (1988), Cochrane (1993), Belo (2010), and Jermann (2010), develop alternative
production technologies to recover the stochastic discount factor from the marginal rates of
transformation inferred from producers’ first-order conditions, to directly link investment
to stock returns without consumption.
This paper is related to the asset pricing literature studying general equilibrium pro-
duction models. This literature demonstrates that it is difficult for standard production
models to match both business cycle and asset pricing moments (see Jermann (1998) and
14Relatedly, firms’ hiring is like investment when there are labor adjustment costs. Belo et al. (2014a)
show that firms with higher hiring rates also have lower average future stock returns.
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Boldrin et al. (2001), who use internal habit preferences (e.g., Abel (1990a); Constantinides
(1990))).15 Chen (2017) improves over the previous models by introducing external habit
preference (Campbell and Cochrane (1999)) to the standard production model and shows
that a low intertemporal elasticity of substitution paired with large capital adjustment cost
can generate a high equity premium and a high investment volatility while giving a low
volatility of the risk-free rate. Chen (2017) also shows that the investment rate can predict
stock returns in his model as in the data. I introduce two types of capital—equipment and
structures with heterogeneous TTB—into his single-capital model. I find that TTB damp-
ens the volatility of structures investment, delays the responses of structures investment to
productivity shocks, and weakens the predicting power of structures investment for stock
returns. My TTB model shares some similarities with the two-sector model with factor
immobilities in Boldrin et al. (2001). In both models, capital supply is inelastic in the short
run.16 This leads to consumption overshooting and the “inverted leading-indicator property
of interest rates” as in the data. Consumption volatility is usually too high in this type
of models featuring inelastic short-run capital supply. But because there are two types of
capital in my model, equipment investment can absorb the productivity shocks on impact
in addition to consumption. Thus my model can deliver a realistic consumption volatility.
This paper is also related to the vast literature on time-series return predictability (see
Lettau and Ludvigson (2010) and Koijen and Van Nieuwerburgh (2011) for an overview),
and in particular the predictability of macro quantities (such as output, consumption, in-
vestment, and labor) for stock returns. Cochrane (1991) and Lamont (2000) show that
investment predicts stock returns. I show that equipment investment is more tightly linked
to future stock returns than structures investment. Other macro predictors include the
15See Kogan and Papanikolaou (2012) for an overview. See the seminal Mehra and Prescott (1985);
the early Tallarini (2000); papers related to long-run consumption risk à la Bansal and Yaron (2004):
Kaltenbrunner and Lochstoer (2010), Campanale et al. (2010), Ai et al. (2013), Croce (2014), Kung and
Schmid (2015), Ai et al. (2017); papers related to rare disasters à la Barro (2006): Gourio (2012); papers
related to investment shocks: Papanikolaou (2011), Garlappi and Song (2017); papers related to labor
frictions: Danthine and Donaldson (2002), Favilukis and Lin (2015), and Petrosky-Nadeau et al. (2017); and
papers related to technology innovation and competition: Gârleanu et al. (2012a), Gârleanu et al. (2012b),
Bena et al. (2016), Gârleanu et al. (2016), Corhay et al. (2017), Gofman et al. (2017), and Kogan et al.
(2017); among others.
16In my model, the supply of structures capital is inelastic in the short run due to TTB, but the supply
of equipment capital is partially elastic under adjustment costs.
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consumption-wealth ratio (CAY; Lettau and Ludvigson (2001)), the consumption-labor in-
come ratio (Santos and Veronesi (2006)), the output gap (Cooper and Priestley (2009)), the
employment growth (Chen and Zhang (2011); Belo et al. (2017)), the ratio of new orders
to shipments of durable goods (Jones and Tuzel (2013b)), the expected investment growth
(Li et al. (2017)), and the government debt-output ratio (Liu (2017)), etc.
This paper is structured as follows. Section 2 describes the data, defines the variables
used, presents summary statistics, and shows the empirical specifications and results. Sec-
tion 3 sets up the model and derives theoretical implications. Section 4 presents calibration
and quantitative predictions, and Section 5 concludes.
1.2 Empirical Evidence
In this section, I first describe the data dealings and constructions for the main variables—
the investment rates of equipment and structures—at aggregate level, asset level, industry
level, and international level. I then present the summary statistics. Next, I provide
evidence of longer TTB for structures than for equipment. Last, I specify the predictive
regressions of investment rates for risk premia and present the empirical results and note
in particular that the investment rates of equipment predict risk premia better than the
investment rates of structures.
1.2.1 Data
I follow Cochrane (1991) and construct the time series of the investment-capital ratio or






1− δ + IKt−1
. (1.1)
The initial value of the investment rate is set to be the steady-state level, i.e., the deprecia-
tion rate plus the average investment growth rate, IK0 = δ +E(It/It−1). Given the initial
value, the whole time series of the investment rate can be derived from the above recursion.
I use quarterly investment data from BEA National Income Product Accounts (NIPA)
tables and annual depreciation rates implied from BEA Fixed Assets (FA) tables. I use
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one-fourth of annual depreciation rates as quarterly rates. The sample period is from 1947
quarter 1 to 2015 quarter 4. Quarterly private nonresidential real equipment and structures
investment is from nominal values in NIPA Table 1.1.5 line 11 (equipment) and line 10
(structures) deflated by corresponding price indexes in NIPA Table 1.1.4. In NIPA, total
private nonresidential investment includes equipment, structures, and intellectual property
and products (IPP). Since this paper focuses on equipment and structures, I exclude IPP for
convenience and consistency.17 To construct a series for real total nonresidential investment
without IPP, I apply the Fisher formula to equipment and structures.18
I calculate annual depreciation rates as the time-series averages of the ratio of real
depreciation to last yearend real capital stock. The real capital stock series for equipment
and structures are the nominal capital stocks of base year 2009 in FA Table 1.1 line 5
(equipment) and line 6 (structures) multiplied by the corresponding chain-type quantity
indices in FA Table 1.2 and scaled by 100. The real depreciation series for equipment and
structures are constructed similarly with nominal stocks in FA Table 1.3 and chain-type
quantity indexes in FA Table 1.4. I apply the Fisher formula again to obtain the real capital
stock and real depreciation of total nonresidential capital without IPP. Annual estimates
for depreciation rates of nonresidential total, equipment, and structures are, respectively,
5.04%, 10.90%, and 3.17%.19
I construct quarterly disaggregated nonresidential equipment and structures investment
rates at asset level. BEA disaggregates nonresidential equipment into information process-
ing equipment, industrial equipment, transportation equipment, and other equipment, and
nonresidential structures into commercial and health care; manufacturing; power and com-
munication; mining exploration, shafts and wells; and other structures. I apply the same
17Including IPP has little effect on empirical results; see Appendix A.5.







, where p’s and q’s represent price indices and real quantities of equipment and
structures. See Bureau of Economic Analysis (2016) for how BEA constructs aggregate estimates from
detailed components.
19Note that directly using current-cost measures will generate a higher depreciation rate for equipment
and a slightly lower depreciation rate for structures as the relative price of equipment has been declining
over the sample and the relative price of structures has increased a little. Current cost measures capture
both physical wear and economic obsolescence, while real cost measures account for only physical wear. See
Jermann (2010), who estimates depreciation rates in current cost measures over the sample 1947-2002 for
equipment and structures to be 13.06% and 2.7%, respectively. After adjusting prices, he obtains 11.2% and
3.1%.
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perpetual inventory method in equation (1.1). I use investment data from NIPA Table
5.3.4 and 5.3.5, and calculate implied depreciation rates from FA Table 2.1, 2.2, 2.4, and
2.5. The data sample is from 1947Q1 to 2015Q4 for equipment assets and from 1959Q1 to
2015Q4 for structures assets, due to the absence of data for early years.
I also construct annual disaggregated equipment and structures investment rates at
industry level.20 I use BEA 19 industries classified by the three-digit 2012 North American
Industry Classification System (NAICS). I apply the same perpetual inventory method as
in equation (1.1). I use investment data from FA Table 3.7E, 3.7S, 3.8E, and 3.8S, and
calculate implied depreciation rates from FA Table 3.1E, 3.1S, 3.2E, 3.2S, 3.4E, 3.4S, 3.5E,
and 3.5S. At the industry level, BEA reports only total investment of nonresidential and
residential, and does not report them separately. This data limitation introduces the effect
of residential investment to the industry-level analysis. However, residential investment is
mostly reflected in the real estate sector and has little effect on other sectors. To mitigate
the effect of residential investment, I drop the real estate industry. I also drop finance
and utilities, following the standard practice in the literature. In addition, I drop two
industries—management of companies and enterprises and educational services—due to
limited data on stock returns. This leaves 14 industries for analysis.
The data for total factor productivity (TFP) is from John Fernald’s website, “dtfp”.
Real gross domestic product (GDP) is the nominal value in NIPA Table 1.1.5 line 1 deflated
by the corresponding price index in NIPA Table 1.1.4. The data for nominal aggregate
stock market returns and the risk-free rate is from Kenneth French’s website. Real returns
are nominal returns deflated by seasonally adjusted consumer price index for all urban
consumers from the Bureau of Labor Statistics.
Industry-level returns are calculated from the Center for Research in Security Prices
(CRSP) and Compustat. I use monthly stock returns from CRSP, and correct the delist-
ing bias following the approach in Shumway (1997). I include firms with common shares
(shrcd=10 and 11) and firms traded on the NYSE, AMEX, and NASDAQ (exchcd=1, 2, and
3). I use Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) and NAICS from the CRSP/Compustat
Merged Annual Industrial Files. Firms are assigned to BEA industries based on their
20Industry-level data are not available at quarterly frequency.
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NAICS. If a firm’s NAICS is not available, it is set to be the most frequent 3 digit NAICS
based on the firm’s SIC.21 The industry risk premium is calculated as the difference between
the value-weighted returns for all firms in that industry and the risk-free rate. The sample
is annual from 1962 to 2015.
I construct UK aggregate investment rate series for nonresidential equipment and struc-
tures, using the perpetual inventory method in equation (1.1). Quarterly investment data
from 1970Q1-2013Q4 are downloaded from “gross fixed capital formation by 6 asset types”
(namq pi6 k) in the Eurostat database. Nonresidential equipment is the aggregate sum
of N11131 transport equipment and N11132 other machinery and equipment, while non-
residential structures is N1112 other buildings and structures. Data for returns are from
Kenneth French’s and John Campbell’s websites and International Monetary Fund (IMF)
International Financial Statistics. See Appendix A.3 for more details.
1.2.2 Descriptive Statistics
Table 1.1 reports the descriptive statistics of investment rates at aggregate level, asset
level and industry level. Panel A shows statistics for quarterly aggregate investment rates.
Equipment shows a higher depreciation rate than structures, 2.72% vs 0.79%. Equipment IK
has a higher mean (3.88%) and volatility (0.49%) than structures IK (1.35%, 0.25%), while
structures IK is slightly more persistent than equipment IK, 0.99 vs. 0.97. Equipment IK
highly correlates with total nonresidential IK (0.93), but has a relatively small correlation
with structures IK (0.26).
[Insert Table 1.1 about here]
[Insert Figure 1.1 about here]
Figure 1.1 depicts the time series of quarterly aggregate investment rates, which are
procyclial. However, structures IK is less procyclical than equipment IK, such as in the
recessions of the mid-1950s and early 1960s; structures IK actually increases over the two
recessions. Structures IK also shows delayed responses in the 1981-1982 recession and the
21In rare cases, there is no NAICS match for the firm’s SIC, and the SIC-NAICS concordance tables from
the US Census Bureau are used.
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recent Great Recession of 2007-2009. There are small increases for structures IK at the
beginning of the two recessions before it falls; in contrast, equipment IK falls immediately
once the recession starts. The correlation between Hodrick-Prescott (HP; Hodrick and
Prescott (1997)) filtered IK and HP-filtered log GDP is 0.81 for equipment and 0.48 for
structures (not tabulated).
Table 1.1 Panel B shows the statistics for quarterly asset-level investment rates of equip-
ment and structures. Information processing equipment has the highest mean (5.69%) ,
volatility (0.95%), and correlation with aggregate nonresidential (0.87) among all of the
asset types. This conforms to the rise of information and communications technology in the
economy over the post-war sample.22 Mining exploration, shafts, and wells shows the low-
est correlations among all asset types: 0.21, 0.03, and 0.31, with aggregate nonresidential,
equipment, and structures respectively. This is likely because among all of the structures
types, mining structures capital depreciates the fastest (1.91%) and the net investment rate
(gross net of depreciation) of mining is the smallest (0.24%).
Table 1.1 Panel C shows the statistics for annual industry-level investment rates of equip-
ment and structures. First, industry equipment displays faster depreciation than industry
structures. The lowest depreciation rate among industry equipment—8.93% of transporta-
tion and warehousing equipment—is still higher than the highest depreciation rate among
industry structures, i.e., 7.01% of mining structures. Second, industry equipment IKs are
all positively correlated with aggregate nonresidential IK and aggregate equipment IK.
However, the structures IKs of health care and social assistance and other services except
government are mildly negatively correlated with aggregate nonresidential IK. Puzzlingly,
the structure IK of transportation and warehousing has a significant negative correlation of
-0.41 with aggregate structure IK. The likely reason is that this industry has the second-
lowest average gross IK (2.98%) and net IK (0.75%). The industry with the lowest structure
IK is agriculture, which has 2.17% gross IK and -0.32% net IK. Agriculture is the only in-
dustry whose structures investment falls behind the depreciation.
22See Ward (2017) for the evolution and growth implications of IT sector.
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Business-Cycle Properties of Investment
I document that equipment investment is different from structures investment in its business-
cycle properties. Equipment investment tends to comove with TFP and GDP, while struc-
tures investment tends to lag TFP and GDP for several quarters. Table 1.2 reports the
quarterly cross-correlations between nonresidential investment (equipment and structures)
and TFP, and between nonresidential investment and GDP. I calculate three types of cross-
correlations using first-differenced data, HP-filtered data (λ = 1600), and bandpass-filtered
data (Baxter and King (1999), fluctuations from 6 to 32 quarters), as shown in Panels A,
B, and C, respectively.
[Insert Table 1.2 about here]
[Insert Figure 1.2 about here]
The first robust result is that equipment has a significant higher contemporaneous cor-
relation (i = 0) with TFP and GDP (ranging from 0.42 to 0.80) than structures (ranging
from 0.05 to 0.44). In particular, the contemporaneous correlation between structures and
TFP is fairly small: 0.13, 0.05, and 0.08 across the three measures. Second, structures lags
TFP and GDP more quarters than equipment. Structures lags TFP 3-4 quarters, and lags
GDP about 2 quarters, while equipment lags TFP 0-2 quarters, and lags GDP 0-1 quarter.
Figure 1.2 shows the correlations between investment growth and TFP growth (i.e., first-
differenced data). Equipment investment comoves with TFP, but structures investment
lags TFP 4 quarters with increasing correlations from a 1-quarter lag to a 4-quarter lag.
The bivariate VAR analysis with TFP growth (ordered first) and investment growth also
highlights the lagging behavior of structures investment, as shown in Appendix Figure A.1.
Christiano and Todd (1996) show that TTB and TTP help explain the fact that nonresi-
dential investment lags output over the business cycle. Leaning on their findings, I show
later in the paper that assuming a longer TTB (along with TTP) for structures than for
equipment can generate a longer investment lag for structures than for equipment.
In addition, the positive correlations between structures and GDP stretch into long hori-
zons at 5- and 6-quarter investment lags, where equipment has little or negative correlation
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to GDP. Take the HP-filtered measure, for example: The correlations between structures
and GDP with 5- and 6-quarter investment lags are 0.35 and 0.22, respectively, while the
analogs for equipment are 0.03 and -0.13. See also Stock and Watson (1999), who show the
cyclicality of various macro quantities and prices, including nonresidential equipment and
structures.
1.2.3 Direct Evidence of TTB
Before getting into the main empirical analysis, I provide some direct empirical evidence
for a longer TTB for structures than for equipment, which this paper emphasizes.
The source data BEA use to construct series of nonresidential equipment investment
is based on the Census Bureau’s Survey of Manufacturers’ Shipments, Inventories, and
Orders. Abel and Blanchard (1988) estimate delivery lags using this survey, along with other
datasets, and find that the delivery lags are 2, 2, 3, and 0 quarters for fabricated metals,
non-electrical machinery, electrical machinery, and motor vehicles, respectively. Jones and
Tuzel (2013a) also use this survey and show that the delivery lag (approximated by the ratio
of unfilled orders to shipments) for durable goods is about 4 months. In detail, the delivery
lags are 1.99, 2.44, 3.28, 2.93, and 6.22 for primary metal, fabricated metal, industrial
machinery, electronic equipment, and transportation equipment.
The source data BEA use to construct series of nonresidential structures investment is
based on the Census Bureau’s Survey of Construction Spending, also known as the Value
of Construction Put in Place Survey. Montgomery (1995) uses the confidential project-level
data from this survey of over 52,000 private nonresidential construction projects and finds
that the value-weighted construction length of time (LoT) averages 5 to 6 quarters (16.7
months) over the period 1961-1991.23 Although I do not have access to project-level data,
I update the LoT statistic for the recent sample 2001-2015, using publicly available data
from the Census Bureau website: see Appendix A.1 for details.
Table 1.3 reports the LoT, or the average number of months from start to completion,
for private nonresidential construction projects in 1990-91 and 2001-2015 by value and type
of construction. Montgomery (1995) shows that the value-weighted LoT is 15.7 months in
23Construction LoT in the language of the Census Bureau, is the same as TTB period in this paper.
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1990-91. I find that the value-weighted LoT is 13.6 months over 2001-2015.24 Although
there is a 2- to 3-month decrease over the years, the LoT of 4-5 quarters for nonresidential
structures is significantly longer than the delivery lag for nonresidential equipment. The
difference is sizable, in terms of the standard quarterly frequency used in the presentation
of macro data by statistical agencies and in the calibration of macro models.
[Insert Table 1.3 about here]
The LoT increases with project value, as shown in Panel A. During 2001-15, it takes
20.1 months to complete a project valued at $10,000 thousands or more and 3.9 months for
$75-$249 thousands. The equal-weighted LoT across all projects decreases from 14 months
in 1990-91 to 7.6 months in 2001-15. This is likely because there are many more small
projects in the recent sample, since LoTs across value categories do not change much. This
also leads to significantly shorter LoTs across different types in 2001-15 relative to 1990-91,
as shown in Panel B. Consistently across different samples and equal- or value- weighted
measures, commercial buildings have the shortest LoT. Nevertheless, Millar et al. (2016)
find that TTP lags are long for commercial construction projects—about 16 months for the
equal-weighted measure and about 26 months for the value-weighted measure.
1.2.4 Empirical Specifications




Rt+h = a+ b IKt + εt+H . (1.2)
H is the forecast horizon in quarters.
∑H
h=1Rt+h is the H-period cumulated log excess
return for the aggregate stock market or for one industry. Rt is the difference between
log aggregate or industry stock return and log risk-free rate. IKt is the investment rate at
24We would expect that there is a significantly shorter LoT for recent sample years, as the technology has
improved. Instead, the construction industry has become less productive. One reason is that the industry
has become less capital-intensive, with machinery replaced by workers; see Economist (2017): “ ‘While
we are all using iPhones, construction is still in the Walkman [Sony cassette player] phase,’ says Ben van
Berkel, a Dutch architect. Many building professionals use hand-drawn plans riddled with errors. A builder
of concrete-framed towers from the 1960s would find little has changed on building sites today, except for
better safety standards.”
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aggregate, asset or industry level. Both in-sample and out-of-sample tests are performed.
For in-sample tests, I report R2, the regression slope coefficient b, and Newey and West
(1987) p values with the correcting lag for standard errors being the number of overlapping
periods, H − 1. For out-of-sample tests, I use the first half of the sample as the training
sample, then recursively test and retrain in subsequent periods. I report out-of-sample R2
relative to historical mean forecasts and the ENC-NEW encompassing test statistic from
Clark and McCracken (2001).
1.2.5 Empirical Results
This subsection establishes the empirical finding that the equipment investment rate pre-
dicts stock returns better than the structures investment rate with the use of US aggregate-,
US asset-, US industry-, and UK aggregate-level data.
How Do Aggregate IKs Predict Aggregate Returns?
Aggregate equipment IK predicts market excess returns better than aggregate structures
IK. Table 1.4 reports return predictability results for US investment rates of private nonres-
idential total, equipment, and structures. Consistent with neoclassical investment theory,
all prediction slope coefficients are negative. When discount rates fall, investment should
increase. Consistent with Cochrane (1991) and Lamont (2000), nonresidential IK predicts
the aggregate risk premium very well, both in-sample and out-of-sample. The R2 increases
over horizons from 1 quarter to 20 quarters, with in-sample R2 increasing from 3.90% to
39.26% and out-of-sample R2 increasing from 0.68% to 33.98% at 16 quarters and decreas-
ing to 26.99% at 20 quarters. Equipment IK predicts risk premium as well as nonresidential
IK, but structures IK has small in-sample R2 and negative out-of-sample R2. This suggests
that equipment is the driving component that links nonresidential investment to stock re-
turns.25 Goyal and Welch (2008) show that the out-of-sample R2 is usually negative for
well-known return predictors, including the dividend-price ratio and the book-market ra-
tio. The strong positive out-of-sample R2 for IK suggests that IK truly contains useful
25Table A.1 shows that the component intellectual property and product of nonresidential investment
shows little return predictability. Certainly, IPP has become an important part of nonresidential investment
in the recent years. And there is mismeasurement for IPP in BEA data.
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information for predicting movements in the risk premium.
[Insert Table 1.4 about here]
[Insert Figure 1.3 about here]
Figure 1.3 shows the actual and predicted future 5-year-ahead risk premium from 1947Q2
to 2011Q1 when the predictor is equipment IK. The predicted in-sample risk premium is
countercyclical and captures a significant portion of the variation in the actual risk premium.
The predicted out-of-sample risk premium in the second half of the sample almost coincides
with the predicted in-sample risk premium. This indicates that the predicting coefficients
are fairly stable.
[Insert Table 1.5 about here]
The IK series following Cochrane (1991) are constructed under the assumption of con-
stant depreciation rates.26 In reality, however, depreciation rates are time-varying. To check
the robustness of the results to this assumption, I construct alternative IK series following
the method in Bachmann et al. (2013), who use time-varying depreciation estimates from
BEA;27 see Appendix A.2 for details. Table 1.5 reports the return predictability results from
these alternative IK series, which are similar to those in Table 1.4. The predicting power
for equipment IK is even stronger than nonresidential IK at longer horizons; for example,
equipment IK has a 33.71% in-sample R2 and a 43.21% out-of-sample R2, while the analogs
for nonresidential IK are 27.74% and 19.86%, respectively, at the 20-quarter horizon.
How Do Asset-Level IKs Predict Aggregate Returns?
Does a specific type of equipment or structures drive the predicting difference between ag-
gregate equipment and aggregate structures? Do different types of equipment or structures
show significant differences in predicting aggregate risk premium? Table 1.6 answers these
questions; it reports predictability results by equipment- and structures-asset types. All
26Typical macro models assume this as well.
27BEA calculates aggregate equipment and structures investment from detailed asset-level investment
data. BEA assumes constant depreciation rates for detailed assets, but due to compositional changes over
time, aggregate equipment and structures have time-varying depreciation rates.
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of the four types of equipment, i.e., information processing, industrial, transportation, and
other, predict aggregate risk premium well. Also, structures types generally exhibit lower
predicting R2 than equipment. Therefore, equipment’s superior performance to structures
in return predictions is not driven by a specific type of equipment or structures asset.
[Insert Table 1.6 about here]
Notably, the investment in mining exploration, shafts, and wells has no predicting power
and the predicting slope is even positive though not significant. This positive slope is driven
by the sub-asset type petroleum and natural gas.28 As shown in Bornstein et al. (2017), the
average lag between investment and production in the oil industry is 12 years. The long
TTB lag makes the investment in oil wells reflect mostly past economic climates and reacts
little to future business conditions. Investment in petroleum and natural gas is acyclical,
and has a contemporaneous correlation of 0.04 with GDP and -0.05 with TFP in growth
rates.
How Do Industry IKs Predict Aggregate and Industry Returns?
Industry equipment IK predicts aggregate risk premium better than industry structures IK
does. Table 1.7 Panel A shows how 14 US industry equipment IK series and structures
IK series predict aggregate risk premium at a 5-year horizon. The last column shows that
equipment has a higher predicting R2 than structures for all industries except mining. The
difference in R2 can be as large as about 20% for wholesale and transportation and ware-
housing. The positive slope of mining (2.81) structures IK is reminiscent of the result for
structures type mining exploration, shafts, and wells in Table 1.6. Consistently, detailed
industry-level data show that the oil and gas extraction industry drives the positive predic-
tion. The detailed industry-level data also show that the railroad transportation industry
drives the positive predicting slope (3.45) of transportation and warehousing structures IK.
This rejoins the idea that investment in assets with long TTB periods may even predict
aggregate risk premium positively, though not significantly.
28Mining exploration, shafts, and wells include two sub-asset types, i.e., petroleum and natural gas and
mining. Mining actually has a negative predicting slope.
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In addition, service industries have lower R2 than traditional industries such as man-
ufacturing; a possible explanation is that service industries are labor-intensive instead of
capital-intensive. Fluctuations in labor hiring in these industries, therefore, may be more
informative about aggregate economic conditions.
[Insert Table 1.7 about here]
For most industries, equipment IK also captures more industry risk premium than struc-
tures IK does. Table 1.7 Panel B shows how US 14 industry IK series predict each industry’s
risk premium. As shown in the last column, equipment IK outperforms structures IK in the
sectors wholesale trade, transportation and warehousing, information, and professional, sci-
entific, and technical services; the difference of R2 can be as large as about 26%. Structures
IK outperforms equipment IK in the retail sector with about 10% R2 difference.
International Evidence
UK aggregate-level data also show that equipment IK predicts aggregate risk premium
better than structures IK does. Table 1.8 reports return predictability results for UK
quarterly IK series of nonresidential equipment and structures. At short horizons from
1 quarter to 8 quarters, both equipment and structures have little predictability. As the
horizon increases to 16 quarters to 24 quarters, equipment shows significantly higher in-
sample and out-of-sample R2 than structures. For equipment, the in-sample R2 ranges
from 11.12% to 23.46%, and the out-of-sample R2 is large, from 21.33% to 33.18%.
[Insert Table 1.8 about here]
1.2.6 Linking Time Series and Cross Section
Since nonresidential investment rates predict aggregate risk premium, a natural question
is, how do these investment rates predict returns of the established factors that capture
the cross-section of stock returns, especially investment factors? Also, how do nonresi-
dential investment rates predict risk premium of the portfolios sorted on the character-
istics related to firm risk? Table 1.9 reports prediction results for various factor returns
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and portfolio risk premium at a 20-quarter horizon, including returns of four factors from
Fama and French (2016) 5-factor model (size (SMB), value (HML), investment (CMA),
and profitability (RMW)) and risk premia of the extreme decile portfolios (deciles 1 and
10) associated with the factor characteristics, returns of two factors from Hou et al. (2015)
four-factor model (investment (IA) and profitability (ROE)), and returns of investment-
minus-consumption factor (IMC) from Papanikolaou (2011).29
[Insert Table 1.9 about here]
Equipment IK predicts CMA well with 25% in-sample R2 and 23% out-of-sample R2,
while structures IK has strong predicting power for IA with 46.5% in-sample R2 and 35%
out-of-sample R2. Therefore, nonresidential investment is linked to the investment factors
that capture cross-sectional stock returns. Also, the linkages between equipment and CMA
and between structures and IA may provide directions for distinguishing the economic forces
behind the two investment factors.30 In addition, the non-predictability for RMW versus
moderate predictability for ROE also shows the difference between the two profitability
factors.31,32
Equipment IK and structures IK predict IMC negatively. When the expected returns for
investment firms relative to consumption firms fall, aggregate investment should rise.33 It is
also worthwhile to note that structures IK has moderate predictability for HML with 15%
in-sample R2 and 17% out-of-sample R2. Another intriguing result is that equipment IK,
as a good predictor for aggregate risk premium, predicts risk premia of less risky portfolio
deciles (Size10, Value1, Inv10) with higher R2 and more negative slope coefficients, except
for profitability portfolios.
29I thank Dimitris Papanikolaou for sharing the data series of the IMC portfolio and Lu Zhang for sharing
the data series of q factors.
30The correlation between CMA and IA is 0.92; see Zhang (2017) for discussions on the two investment
factors.
31Equipment IK has a 9% in-sample R2 for ROE at an 8-quarter horizon (not tabulated) but zero pre-
dictability at a 20-quarter horizon (tabulated).
32The correlation between RMW and ROE is 0.67.
33IMC has a negative correlation with CMA (-0.52) and IA (-0.55).
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1.3 Model
To explain the stronger power of equipment investment than structures investment for pre-
dicting returns and the lagging behavior of structures investment to total factor productivity
(TFP), in this section I build a general equilibrium production model that features a longer
TTB for structures than for equipment.
1.3.1 Economic Environment
There is a representative firm and a representative household in the aggregate production
economy. The representative firm has a Cobb-Douglas production function F with self-
accumulated equipment capital Ket, structures capital Kst and employed household labor
Lt as inputs,






where Yt is the total output, αe (αs) is the production share of equipment (structures), At
is the TFP, and Zt is the deterministic growth component. At follows an AR(1) process,
log(At+1) = ρa log(At) + εt+1,
where ρa (0 < ρa < 1) is the persistence parameter, and ε is the TFP shock, which follows
a normal distribution, ε ∼ N(0, σ2a). Zt grows exponentially at a constant rate µ starting
from the normalized initial value 1, Zt = exp(µt).
The firm accumulates structures capital from the undepreciated structures capital left
from the previous period and the new structures investment,
Ks,t+1 = (1− δs)Kst +Xs,t−Js+1, (1.3)
where δs is the depreciation rate of structures, and Js is the TTB period for structures
investment. It takes Js periods for Xs,t−Js+1, the structures investment project initiated at
time t−Js+1, to become productive capital. Therefore, there are Js structures projects each
period with 1, 2, ..., Js periods to completion, respectively. Total investment expenditures
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ωsj = 1, (1.4)
where Xs,t−j+1 the investment project initiated at time t − j + 1 with Js − j + 1 peri-
ods to completion, and ωsj is the fraction of investment cost incurred in the jth stage of
the project.34 {ωsj}
Js
j=1 are structural parameters, time-invariant and project-independent.
They sum equal to one and reflect how the investment cost is distributed over the stages
of a project. Similarly, the capital accumulation equation and investment equation for
equipment are as follows:







ωej = 1. (1.6)
I assume Je < Js to capture that structures require a longer time to build. The standard
RBC model, as in Cooley and Prescott (1995), assumes a single type of capital with a
one-period TTB. This corresponds to J = 1 and Xt = It.









Ki, i = e, s,
where Gi is the adjustment cost function and is homogeneous degree of one (HD1) with
respect to Ki and Xi. ηi and νi (capturing curvature) are adjustment cost parameters.
δ̄i = e
µ − 1 + δi is the growth-adjusted depreciation rate, i = e for equipment and i = s for
structures.
The firm is all equity-financed. The residual cash flow, i.e., dividend Dt, is distributed
to the equity-holder, i.e., the household, after the firm pays the investment costs Iet + Ist,
34I have adopted the simplified notation for investment projects Xt−j , as in Christiano and Vigfusson
(2003) and Chen (2016). The original Kydland and Prescott (1982) would denote Xt−j as XJ−j,t−j , which
keeps track of both the time when the project is initiated (t − j) and periods to completion (J − j). This
more complex notation would be more suitable for the recursive formulation of the dynamic programming
problem.
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the capital adjustment costs Ge(t) +Gs(t), and the wage payments WtLt,
Dt = Yt − Iet − Ist −Ge(Ket, Xe,t−Je+1)−Gs(Kst, Xs,t−Js+1)−WtLt. (1.7)
The firm maximizes the cum-dividend firm value Vt (Pt+Dt, Pt is the ex-dividend firm value)
using the stochastic discount factor (SDF) Mt implied from the household’s optimality
conditions,
Vt ≡ Pt +Dt = max






subject to the capital accumulation equations (1.3) and (1.5), the investment equations
(1.4) and (1.6), and the cash flow constraint (1.7).
The representative household has external habit preferences (see Campbell and Cochrane
(1999) and, more recently, Chen (2017)). The household maximizes lifetime utility subject







(Ct+j −Ht+j)1−γ − 1
1− γ

Ct + Ptχt+1 +Bt+1 ≤WtLt + (Pt +Dt)χt +RftBt.
β is the time discount factor and γ is the relative risk aversion. At period t, the household
consumes Ct, buys χt+1 share of stocks at price Pt and bonds Bt+1, and receives income from
wage WtLt and portfolio holdings, including stock holdings (Pt +Dt)χt and bond holdings
RftBt, where Rft is the gross risk-free interest rate. H is the habit level the household’s





where x̂ denotes aggregate variable x. ŝt is assumed to follow,
ŝt+1 = (1− ρs)s̄+ ρsŝt + λs(log(Ĉt+1)− log(Ĉt)− µ).
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In the endowment economy model of Campbell and Cochrane (1999), λs is time-varying
and reverse-engineered to achieve a constant risk-free rate. In the production economy
here, I follow Chen (2017) and assume that λs is constant, λs = 1/S̄ − 1. Since there is a
representative household, Ct = Ĉt and St = Ŝt; thus I drop the hat henceforth.
In equilibrium, all markets clear. The clearing of the goods market implies the aggregate
resource constraint,
Ct + Iet + Ist +Ge(Ket, Xe,t−Je+1) +Gs(Kst, Xs,t−Js+1) = Yt.
The labor market clears. Since leisure is assumed to not enter the utility function, labor is
inelastically supplied at the household’s endowment of one unit, Lt = 1. The asset markets
clear: χt = 1 and Bt = 0. That is, there is one share of stock and zero net supply of risk-free
bonds in the economy.
1.3.2 Investment Q and Asset Prices
Let the Lagrange multipliers on equations (1.5) and (1.3) be qe and qs, respectively. The
first order condition for Xit implies






 , i = e, s.
(1.8)
qe (qs) is the shadow price or marginal q of equipment (structures) capital. GXi denotes
the partial derivative of function Gi with respect to Xi. The left-hand-side is the marginal
benefit of investment in the new project Xit. Due to TTB, the one additional unit of new
investment will become productive capital at time t+Ji−1 and can be sold at price qi,t+Ji+1.
The right-hand-side is the marginal cost. The first term is the adjustment cost that occurs
at time t + Ji − 1. The second term reflects how the one additional unit of investment in
the new project goes into investment expenditures across the stages of the project. Due to
TTB, the costs and benefits occur with time lags, to which expectations and discounting
are thus applied.35
35When Ji = 1, the standard q-investment equation appears, qit = GXi(Kit, Xit) + 1.
25
The first-order condition for Ki,t+1 implies the asset pricing equation











FKi(t+ 1)−GKi(Ki,t+1, Xi,t−Ji+2) + (1− δi)qi,t+1
qit
.
M is the SDF implied from the household’s optimality conditions. GKi denotes the partial
derivative of function Gi with respect to Ki. Ri,t+1 is the investment return in equipment
(i = e) or structures (i = s). Its denominator is the marginal cost of installing an ad-
ditional unit of capital at time t, qit, and its numerator is the corresponding benefits at
time t + 1, which includes the marginal product of capital FKi(t + 1), the sale value of
the undepreciated extra unit of capital qi,t+1(1 − δi), and the savings in adjustment cost
−GKi(Ki,t+1, Xi,t−Ji+2).
Define the stock return Rm,t+1 as the firm’s cum-dividend value divided by the previous
period ex-dividend value, and the total investment return RI,t+1 as the value-weighted












Proposition 1. Because both the Cobb-Douglas production function and adjustment cost
functions are homogeneous of degree 1 (HD1), the firm value Pt can be shown to satisfy
Et−Js+2(Mt−Js+2,tPt) = Et−Js+2[(Mt−Js+2,t(qetKe,t+1 + qstKs,t+1)]︸ ︷︷ ︸







+ ...+ Et−Js+2 (Mt−Js+2,tωs1Xst)︸ ︷︷ ︸








+ ...+ Et−Js+2 (Mt−Js+2,tωe1Xet)︸ ︷︷ ︸
value of unfinished equipment projects
.
(1.10)
Proof. See Appendix A.4 for the derivation.
The value of the firm equals the value of the productive capital, plus the value of the
completed parts of all the unfinished equipment and structures projects.36 When Je = Js =
1, the firm value equals the value of the productive capital, and the average q (Q) equals
the (capital-weighted) marginal q (Hayashi (1982)),
Pt = qetKe,t+1 + qstKs,t+1









Also, the stock market return equals the investment return, Rm,t+1 = RI,t+1 (Cochrane
(1991); Restoy and Rockinger (1994)). When Je = Js = 2, equation (1.10) can be simplified
without expectation,37





Xit is the newly initiated project, which will be completed w
i
1 fraction in this period and
wi2 fraction in the next period. The completed w
i
1 fraction of the project contributes to the
firm value in addition to the productive capital. Due to the existence of unfinished projects,









(qe,t+1 −GXe(Ke,t+1, Xet) + ωe2)Xet
Pt
+
(qs,t+1 −GXs(Ks,t+1, Xst) + ωs2)Xst
Pt
.
36See equation (32) in Altuğ (1993), who derives a similar equation under partial equilibrium.
37Kuehn (2009) derives the firm value in the case of a single type of capital with two-period TTB. I
derive a more general expression for firm value when there are two types of capital with potentially different
multiple TTB periods. The expression can easily be extended to the case of multiple (more than two) types
of capital.
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The stock return does not equal the investment return, Rm,t+1 6= RI,t+1. The introduction
of multiple-period TTB breaks down the equivalence between average q and marginal q and
between the stock return and the investment return.
Finally, the risk-free rate is defined as
Rft = 1/Et(Mt,t+1).
And the risk premium is Rex,t = Rmt −Rf,t−1.
1.4 Quantitative Results
In this section, I first calibrate the model. Then I show that the model matches the em-
pirical moments for macro quantities and asset prices. Next, I demonstrate that the model
generates the lagging behavior of structures investment to TFP and the better return pre-
dictability for equipment investment than for structure investment, as in the data. I examine
the model mechanism through the impulse response functions. After that, I show that the
model provides theoretical support for previous empirical findings of return predictability
from planned investment. Finally, I show that discount rates drive the variation in the
dividend-price ratio in the model, as in the data.
1.4.1 Calibration
The model is calibrated at quarterly frequency. Table 1.10 shows the parameter values.
Several are from Chen (2017), including the average GDP per capita growth rate µ set to
0.0048, the persistence of TFP ρ set to 0.98, the time discount factor β set to 0.995, the
risk-aversion coefficient γ set to 2 as in Campbell and Cochrane (1999), the persistence of
surplus consumption ratio ρs set to 0.98, and the steady state of surplus consumption ratio
S̄ set to 0.07. The volatility of TFP shock σa is set to 0.01 to largely match the average
volatility of GDP growth of 0.97. It is between the value of 0.007 used in Cooley and
Prescott (1995) and 0.018 used in Boldrin et al. (2001).
[Insert Table 1.10 about here]
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The rest of the parameters capture the heterogeneities between equipment and struc-
tures. First, the growth-adjusted depreciation rates of equipment and structures, δ̄e and
δ̄s, are set to be the average quarterly equipment and structures investment rates 0.0386
and 0.0125, which results in depreciation rates 0.0338 and 0.0077. Second, the capital share
αe + αs is set to 0.36 as in Tuzel (2010). Individual production shares for equipment and
structures, αe and αs, are then calibrated to match the average relative ratio of private
nonresidential equipment investment to structures investment, 1.86. This gives αe as 0.202
and αs as 0.158, which are close to the values of 0.216 and 0.144 used by Tuzel (2010). The
resulting steady state of the relative ratio of equipment capital stock to structures capital
stock is about 0.6, which is consistent with Tuzel (2010) and Jermann (2010).
The third heterogeneity is the capital adjustment cost. The literature is not settled
on whether equipment or structures is more costly to adjust. Israelsen (2010) estimates
higher adjustment costs for equipment, while Tuzel (2010) and Jermann (2010) calibrate
higher adjustment costs for structures.38 Since the adjustment costs in the model are zero
at the deterministic steady state, there is no counterpart in macro data that can be used to
calibrate the adjustment cost parameters. I follow Greenwood et al. (2000) and set the same
parameter values for equipment and structures. I use the standard quadratic adjustment
cost, νe = νs = 2. I calibrate the adjustment cost parameter η to largely match the relative
volatility of equipment and structures investment growth to output growth, 3.65 and 3.12,
respectively. This leads to ηe = ηs = 50.
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Finally, the TTB specifications are different for equipment and structures. As the evi-
dence presented in Section 1.2.3 shows, the TTB for equipment Je is set to 1 to capture a
1-quarter equipment delivery lag, and the TTB for structures Js is set to 5 to capture the
long planning and construction lags. Since Je = 1, ωe = 1. The project completion pat-
tern parameters for structures (ωs =(0.10,0.15,0.20,0.25,0.30)) are set to capture the idea
of time-to-plan in Christiano and Todd (1996) and to match the pattern of the increasing
cross-correlations between structures investment growth and TFP growth.
38The adjustment costs in Israelsen and Jermann’s models are non-quadratic and for aggregate capital
adjustment, while Tuzel’s adjustment cost is quadratic and asymmetric and for firm-level adjustment.
39The numbers seem high, but Chen (2017) shows that an adjustment cost of 100 results in less than 1%
mean adjustment cost as a percentage of output. The adjustment cost percentages in my calibration are
0.09%, 0.17%, and 0.26% for equipment, structures, and total capital, respectively.
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1.4.2 Model Statistics
Because there are seven state variables in the model, namely {Ket,Kst, {Xs,t−i}4i=1, At},
global solution methods are generally infeasible. I solve the model using the perturbation
method with Dynare++ third-order approximation. I first normalize the model variables
by dividing by the deterministic growth component Zt and solve the model in terms of the
stationary variables. Then I add Zt back into the variables in the simulations. The model
is simulated 500 times each 280 quarters, and mean statistics are reported.
Table 1.11 reports the statistics for macro quantities and asset prices across various
model variants. The benchmark model matches the volatilities and correlations of the macro
quantities well. Consumption is less volatile than output, while investment fluctuates much
more than output. As for asset prices, the model generates a high and volatile risk premium
(4.28% mean and 15.01% volatility), as in the data.40 However, the model overshoots the
mean and volatility of the risk-free rate in comparison with the data: 1.92% versus 0.57%
for the mean, and 5.84% versus 2.52% for the volatility.41
[Insert Table 1.11 about here]
To investigate how each heterogeneity between equipment and structures (depreciation,
production share, or TTB) affects model predictions, I strip each heterogeneity out of the
model benchmark separately in three alternative model scenarios, Models 1-3, whose model
statistics are shown in Table 1.11. I find that removing heterogeneity in the depreciation
rate or production share has relatively small effect on model fits. Removing TTB, however,
dramatically reduces model fit in both macro quantities and asset prices.
In Model 1, in which equipment and structures have the same (growth-adjusted) depre-
ciation rate, δ̄e = δ̄s = 0.025, the volatility of equipment investment increases from 3.84% to
4.52%, while the volatility of structures investment decreases from 3.14% to 1.49%. Equip-
ment at a lower depreciation rate needs a larger adjustment when responding to the same
40I assumed that the firm is all equity-financed with zero leverage. Assuming a debt-equity ratio of 0.5
instead will bring the mean risk premium up to a closer match at 6.42%, but overshoot the volatility of the
risk premium at 22.51%.
41The mean and volatility of the risk-free rate in the data could be higher if we use a longer sample. For
example, Campbell (2003) reports that the mean and volatility of the risk-free rate are 2.02% and 8.81%,
respectively, over the sample of 1891-1998.
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amount of a productivity shock, which leads to higher volatility. The opposite is true for
structures. In addition, the stock return and risk premium fall, because the reduced risk due
to higher depreciation of structures outweighs the added risk due to the lower depreciation
of equipment.
In Model 2, in which equipment and structures have the same production share, αe =
αs = 0.18, a lower production share of equipment raises the volatility of equipment invest-
ment from 3.84% to 4.21% and leads to more risky equipment investment. The opposite is
true for structures; structures investment becomes less volatile and less risky. Because the
added risk of equipment investment exceeds the reduced risk of structures investment, the
means and volatilities of stock return and risk premium all rise.
When both equipment and structures have only a 1-quarter TTB in Model 3 (no TTB,
Je = Js = 1), as in the standard RBC model, the short-run supply of structures capital
becomes elastic. The volatility of structures investment rises from 3.14% to 5.77%, and
the volatility of equipment investment falls from 3.84% to 1.67%. This suggests that a
longer TTB reduces the elasticity of structures capital supply and dampens the volatility of
structures investment. This also explains why I do not need to calibrate a higher adjustment
cost for structures as in Tuzel (2010) (her model has the standard one-period TTB) to
match the volatilities of structures investment and equipment investment. Because the
supply of overall capital is more elastic in the economy, consumption absorbs less TFP
shock and becomes less volatile; its volatility decreases from 0.50% to 0.36%. In addition,
the correlation between output and structures investment becomes too high, at 0.97, in
comparison with the data at 0.34. As for asset prices, the means and volatilities of the
stock return and risk premium all fall, due to the higher elasticity of capital supply. Also,
the mean of the risk-free rate rises from 1.92% to 3.81% and its volatility decreases from
5.84% to 0.54%, because the TFP shock loads less in consumption.
1.4.3 Model Discussion
In addition to TTB, several other important elements are built into the model, such as
capital adjustment cost, habit, and TTP. Both TTB and capital adjustment cost reduce
the elasticity of capital supply. TTB makes only the short-run capital supply inelastic,
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while the capital adjustment cost reduces the elasticity in both the short run and long run.
Ceteris paribus, a lower elasticity of capital supply makes the equilibrium price of capital
more volatile (see Kogan and Papanikolaou (2012), Figure 1, for a graphic illustration).
On the other hand, habit preference induces strong motives in consumption smoothing and
amplifies fluctuations in capital demand. This magnifies the effect of the low elasticity of
capital supply due to TTB and capital adjustment cost, and boosts the size and volatility
of the risk premium. In addition, TTP makes investment more risky by loading investment
expenditures more on past investment decisions. I discuss in Models 4-8 how these various
model elements are necessary to achieve reasonable macro quantities and asset prices.
When there is no TTP in Model 4 (ωsi = 0.2, i = 1, ..., 5), structures investment comoves
with output more. Both the volatilities of structures investment and equipment investment
decrease slightly, while the volatility of aggregate investment increases a bit. This leads to
slightly lower consumption volatility. The removal of TTP decreases the stock return and
the risk premium.
When there is no habit or utility is CRRA (constant relative risk aversion) in Model
5 (Ht = 0), consumption volatility jumps to 1.12% and investment volatilities fall. The
removal of habit weakens the desire to smooth consumption and reduces the elasticity of
capital demand, resulting in a high average risk-free rate at 5.77%, a small risk-free rate
volatility at 0.48%, a small stock return volatility at 3.35%, and a low average risk premium
at 0.17%. As is evident from Models 5-8, habit is necessary to generate a sizable and volatile
risk premium.
When adjustment cost is further removed, in addition to habit preference, in Model 6
(Ht = 0, ηe = ηs = 0), both equipment and structures investment become more volatile.
Structures investment has a negative correlation to output at -0.21. This means that struc-
tures investment decreases on impact in response to a positive TFP shock, which translates
into a small negative risk premium at -0.02%. In comparison to Model 5, the zero adjust-
ment cost in Model 6 increases the elasticity of the capital supply at both short and long
horizons. As a result, the volatilities of the stock return and the risk premium decline from
3.35% and 3.26%, respectively, in Model 5 to 0.23% and 0.08% in Model 6.
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In Model 7, TTB instead of the adjustment cost is removed, in addition to habit pref-
erence (Ht = 0, Je = Js = 1). Relative to Model 5 (no habit alone), the rise in investment
volatility is smaller than that in Model 6 (no habit and no adjustment cost). Also, the
decline in stock return volatility is smaller. This is because TTB reduces only the short-run
elasticity of structures capital supply, but adjustment cost technology has a long-lasting
effect on the capital adjustment of both equipment and structures. In addition, both equip-
ment investment and structures investment show perfect correlations with output.
In Model 8, in which there is no habit, no TTB, and no adjustment cost (Ht = 0, Je =
Js = 1, ηe = ηs = 0), both equipment investment and structures investment become highly
volatile. Because they move in opposite directions (as seen from the positive correlation
between output and equipment investment but the opposite for structures investment), the
volatility of aggregate investment is reasonable at 2.45%. Since the capital supply becomes
perfectly elastic without TTB and adjustment cost, the risk premium is negligible and
returns are not volatile.
1.4.4 Predictions on Cross-Correlations
The benchmark model generates similar investment-TFP correlations as in the data. Figure
1.4 depicts how investment growth correlates with TFP growth in the model. The model
generates comovement between equipment investment and TFP and a 4-quarter lag of
structures investment relative to TFP, as in the data (Figure 1.2). However, the mildly
negative correlations for lags at 1-4 quarters between equipment and TFP is inconsistent
with the data. In addition, the model produces higher investment-TFP correlations than in
the data. One possible reason is that I ignore other components of investment in the model,
including inventory, land, and IPP, which are used in John Fernald’s TFP data series.
[Insert Figure 1.4 about here]
To investigate which model assumption of capital heterogeneity leads to the difference in
TFP correlations between equipment and structures, Figure 1.4 also shows the investment-
TFP cross-correlations for three alternative models, stripping out each heterogeneity sepa-
rately, in which equipment and structures have the same depreciation rate (Model 1 ), the
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same production share (Model 2 ), and the same 1-quarter TTB (Model 3 ). The cross-
correlations in Model 1 and Model 2 are similar, as in the benchmark model. But both
equipment investment and structures investment comove with TFP when longer TTB for
structures is assumed away in Model 3. The results suggest that the heterogeneity in TTB
is the key driver of the lagging behavior of structures investment.
1.4.5 Predictions on Return Predictability
The benchmark model also generates reasonable results in return predictability from invest-
ment rates as in the data. Table 1.12 reports the in-sample R2 and regression slopes b for
predictive predictions for the stock return, risk premium, and risk-free rate across various
horizons ranging from 1 quarter to 20 quarters.42
[Insert Table 1.12 about here]
In predicting the stock return, the model produces higher R2 for equipment IK than
structures IK at both short horizons and long horizons, as in the data. The R2 at a 1-
quarter horizon and 20-quarter horizon for equipment versus structures are 7.2% versus
0.8% and 27.9% versus 15.2%. Equipment IK over-predicts the stock return at the short
horizon (20.9% R2 in the model versus 7.9% R2 in the data at a 4-quarter horizon), while
structures IK over predicts the stock return at the long horizon (15.2% R2 in the model
versus 3.7% R2 in the data at a 20-quarter horizon). This result suggests that there may be
a longer TTB for equipment—and an even longer TTB for structures—than what the model
assumes. In addition, the predicting slopes are negative, as in the data. When discount
rates fall, investment rises.
As for predicting the risk premium, the model generates similar R2 for structures IK,
as in the data but relatively low R2 for equipment in comparison with the data. The
reason is that equipment IK predicts the risk-free return negatively with large R2 at short
42Note that model-implied investment rates are generated using the simulated investment data and the
perpetual inventory method, which is how investment rates in the data are constructed. Because the model
assumes multiple-quarter TTB for structures—but a 1-quarter TTB is assumed in the data—directly dividing
the simulated structures investment by the simulated structures capital stock is not consistent with the data
procedure.
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horizons. Because the risk premium is the difference between the stock return and the risk-
free return, the combination of negative predictions for both the stock return and risk-free
return results in less negative predicting slopes and lower R2 for predicting the risk premium
than for predicting the stock return.
To investigate which model assumption of capital heterogeneity drives the difference in
return predictability between equipment and structures, Table 1.12 also shows predictability
results for the three alternative models, stripping out each heterogeneity separately, in
which both equipment and structures have the same depreciation rate (Model 1 ), the same
production share (Model 2 ), and the same 1-quarter TTB (Model 3 ).
In Model 1 and Model 2, the better performance of equipment is preserved. But in Model
3, there is no significant prediction difference between equipment and structures. This is
because when both equipment investment and structures investment react to productivity
shocks in the same way, their marginal q ’s contain the same set of information reflected
in stock prices. Since marginal q is a linear function of IK due to the assumption of the
quadratic adjustment cost, equipment IK and structures IK have similar information for
predicting returns. The results across the three alternative models imply that the assump-
tion of the longer TTB for structures is the driver of the difference in return predictability.
1.4.6 Model Mechanism
To examine the model mechanism, Figure 1.5 depicts the impulse responses of model vari-
ables to a positive one standard deviation of TFP shock (1%) at time 1 across three models,
namely, the benchmark model, Model 3 when there is only a 1-quarter TTB, and Model 6
when utility is CRRA and adjustment cost is zero.
When a positive TFP shock hits the economy in the benchmark model, output, con-
sumption, and equipment investment rise on impact. Structures investment also rises on
impact, but it takes 5 quarters for it to achieve the maximum response due to TTB and
TTP. Because the stock return rises on impact and then declines, the delayed response of
structures investment renders it less informative than equipment investment for predict-
ing the stock return. The structures investment decision (Xs) shows responses similar to
those for equipment investment, and is much more volatile than the structures investment
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(expenditures).43 In addition, because output rises on impact, while structures investment
increases a little, equipment investment and consumption have to overshoot to absorb the
productivity shock. Thus equipment investment and consumption gradually decline from
quarter 1 to quarter 5, when the supply of structures capital becomes elastic.
[Insert Figure 1.5 about here]
Because consumption overshoots on impact, the risk-free rate decreases in the short
run. To see this, first, the surplus-consumption ratio (not shown in the figure) shares
the same pattern of impulse response as consumption. So does the consumption surplus,
which is consumption multiplied by the surplus-consumption ratio (Ct −Ht = Ct ∗ ((Ct −
Ht)/Ct)). Because the consumption surplus rises on impact, the marginal utility of current
consumption surplus falls. The marginal utility of future short-run consumption surplus
also falls, but by a lesser amount, because the consumption surplus declines in the short
run but is still above the stochastic steady state. And the risk-free rate is the ratio of the
former marginal utility to the latter marginal utility (up to the multiplication of the time
discount factor).
The decline of the risk-free rate in the short run is shared by other models that feature
short-run factor inflexibilities, such as the two-sector model with labor and capital immo-
bilities across sectors in Boldrin et al. (2001) and the 1-period TTP model analyzed in that
paper as well. This is both a blessing and a curse. The blessing is that the model gener-
ates the “inverted leading-indicator property of interest rates” as in the data highlighted in
Boldrin et al. (2001): High interest rates today are associated with lower future output.44
The curse is that the risk-free rate becomes too volatile. Also, the equipment IK will be
strongly negatively associated with the short-run risk-free return, because equipment invest-
ment rises on impact, while the risk-free rate drops on impact. This weakens the negative
predictions of equipment IK for the risk premium, as shown in Table 1.12 above.
When both equipment and structures have a 1-quarter TTB (the “No TTB” case in
Figure 1.5), both equipment and structures investment rise on impact. The simultaneous
43Similar to equipment investment, Xs predicts stock returns well, as will be shown in Section 1.4.7.
44See also Beaudry and Guay (1996) and King and Watson (1996). The standard RBC model generates
positive comovement between interest rates and output because the impulse response of consumption is
hump-shaped.
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movement of equipment investment and structures investment makes both investment rates
similarly informative for return fluctuations as shown in Table 1.12. Structures capital
becomes elastic in the short run and absorbs part of the productivity shock, which is loaded
on consumption and equipment investment before. Therefore, structures investment rises
more on impact and becomes more volatile, while equipment and consumption rise less on
impact and become less volatile. Consumption does not overshoot, and the risk-free rate
has a small volatility. The stock return and risk premium rise on impact, then decline to
their stochastic steady states. All of the impulse responses converge to the ones in the
benchmark model after the TTB periods for structures, when structures capital becomes
elastic in the benchmark model.
When the TTB assumption for structures is retained but habit preference and adjust-
ment cost are removed from the model (the “No Habit No Adj” case in Figure 1.5), the
marginal q for equipment equals one and the marginal q for structures investment is smaller
than 1 due to TTB and the discounting. It is more beneficial to invest in equipment in
the short run. Thus, equipment investment overshoots and structures investment even de-
creases on impact. Consumption increases on impact and has a hump-shaped response, as
in a standard RBC model. As a result, the risk-free rate rises on impact and has a small
volatility. Because the removal of habit preference reduces the fluctuation in capital demand
and the removal of adjustment cost makes capital supply more elastic, the resulting stock
return and risk premium have little volatility.
As noted in Rouwenhorst (1991), the impulse responses oscillate for a TTB model with
a single type of capital and no adjustment costs. This is inconsistent with the empirical
evidence. Kuehn (2009) shows that adding the investment adjustment cost can render the
impulse responses to become smooth but adding capital adjustment cost does not work.
Here, even though there is no adjustment cost, the impulse responses are smooth due to
the assumption of two types of capital. Equipment has the standard 1-quarter TTB and
can absorb the shock upfront. The supply of overall capital (equipment plus structures) is
elastic in the short run, although the supply of structures capital is not.
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1.4.7 Planned Investment and Return Predictability
The model provides theoretical support for previous empirical findings of return predictabil-
ity from planned investment, as in Lamont (2000) and Jones and Tuzel (2013b). Table 1.13
shows how the structures investment decision or planned structures investment in the lan-
guage of Lamont (2000) predicts market returns. The growth rate of planned structures
investment (log(Xst/Xs,t−1)) negatively predicts annual market returns with a 10% R
2.
The structures investment rate (Xst/Ks,t+4) also negatively predicts annual market returns
with 12% R2. These two results are empirically shown by Lamont (2000) (in his Tables
III and V, respectively). One difference is that Lamont’s planned investment includes both
structures and equipment.45
[Insert Table 1.13 about here]
The ratio of structures investment decision to structures investment expenditures (Xst/Ist)
is similar to Jones and Tuzel (2013b)’s ratio of nonresidential building starts to structures
investment expenditures (Starts/SI) constructed using the same logic as their new orders
to shipment ratio. Xst/Ist shows the highest predicting R
2 of 25% for annual market re-
turns. The R2 first increases with the predicting horizon up to 4 quarters, then declines.
The pattern is the same when log(Xst/Xs,t−1) is the predictor; but the R
2 for Xst/Ist is
quantitatively larger than the R2 for log(Xst/Xs,t−1).
The pattern of R2 for Starts/SI is different from Xst/Ist. It increases with the predicting
horizon, and is small at short horizons and large at long horizons. This could be due to the
inclusion of government structures investment in Starts/SI. First, government construction
projects usually have longer TTB than private nonresidential construction projects; for
example, Census Bureau (1992) reports that the average number of months from start to
completion for state and local construction projects is 20.3 months, while the analog for
private nonresidential is 14 months. This could lead to predictability’s showing up only in
long horizons.
45Another difference is that for the investment rate that Lamont uses, the capital stock from BEA con-
structed under the assumption of a 1-quarter TTB, while the structures capital stock in the model has a
5-quarter TTB. Because the structures capital stock is persistent in the model, using instead the capital
stock accumulated from the simulated structures investment under the assumption of 1-quarter TTB has
little effect on the result.
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Second, government investment is negatively correlated with private investment (-0.23
correlation), and positively predicts aggregate risk premium, as shown by Belo and Yu
(2013).46 The decomposition of government investment into equipment and structures
shows that the equipment investment rate predicts the risk premium positively at all hori-
zons, while the structures investment rate predicts the risk premium negatively at long
horizons in Jones and Tuzel (2013b)’s sample from 1958 to 2009, as shown in Table A.2.47
If the prediction result for investment expenditures in government structures also holds for
the planned investment, the negative prediction from government structures investment at
long horizons could reinforce the negative prediction from private structures investment,
and lead to the large R2 in long horizons for Starts/SI. It is possible that at short horizons,
the negative correlation between government structures investment and private structures
investment counteracts the negative prediction of private structures investment for the risk
premium and leads to the small R2 for Starts/SI.
1.4.8 Discount Rates versus Cash Flows
If the stock price increases today, either the expected dividend growth increases or the
discount rate falls, or both. Campbell and Shiller (1988) decompose the aggregate dividend-
price ratio into long-run stock returns (discount rates) and long-run dividend growth (cash
flows), and find that discount rates drive the variation in the dividend-price ratio.48 In
the model, TFP shocks drive variations of both discount rates and cash flows. It is not
certain that the return predictability in the model from investment rates truly comes from
discount rate variations; it is possible that cash flows drive the variation in the dividend-
price ratio and correlate negatively with discount rates. High investment today that predicts
lower future discount rates is simply a manifestation for predicting higher future cash flow
growth.
This is not the case, however, seen from the impulse responses in Figure 1.5. When a
positive TFP shock hits the economy, the stock price (P ) and stock return (Rm) rise, while
46Relatedly, Bansal et al. (2016) show that there is reallocation from private investment to government
investment when productivity uncertainty is high.
47The definition of government investment here is slightly different from that of Belo and Yu (2013), who
exclude federal defense spending from gross government investment.
48See Cochrane (2011) for a recent review.
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dividend (D) falls. This suggests that a positive TFP shock acts as a negative discount rate
shock: The stock price has to fall to accommodate the decline in dividends. To verify this
formally, I use VAR analysis and perform Campbell-Shiller decomposition for the dividend-
price ratio; the results are shown in Table 1.14. It is evident that discount rates truly drive
the variation in the dividend-price ratio in the model. Therefore, high investment rates
today are indeed predicting lower discount rates.
[Insert Table 1.14 about here]
The model shows regression results similar to those for data for the first-order VAR: The
dividend-price ratio predicts the next-year stock return significantly positively but does not
predict the next-year dividend growth. The prediction sign in data for dividend growth is
positive. The high long-run coefficient for returns and low coefficient for dividend growth
suggest that discount rates drive the variation in the dividend-price ratio. The variance
decomposition further confirms this; almost all the variation in the dividend-price ratio
comes from the variation in discount rates. The discount rates variation as a percentage
of total dividend-price variation is over 100% (104.46% in the model and 161.67% in the
data), due to the positive correlation between discount rates and cash flows. The variance
in discount rates (0.1307) in the model is smaller than that in the data (0.2435), because
the stock return in the model has a slightly smaller mean and standard deviation than in
the data.
1.5 Conclusion
This paper establishes a new and robust empirical finding: Equipment investment is more
tightly linked to stock returns than structures investment. I build a general equilibrium
production model with heterogeneous time-to-build for equipment and structures to explain
this empirical finding. Equipment investment requires less time to transform into productive
capital, and thus it reacts to productivity shocks more promptly than structures investment,
and reflects more of the information contained in stock prices. For future research, it will be
interesting to explore the implication of heterogeneous TTB for stock returns at firm level.
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Although US Compustat does not provide the split of capital investments into equipment
and structures, the confidential micro data from the US Census Bureau does have this
information, at least for recent sample years. In addition, the international data for some
countries, such as the panel of Italian firms studied by Boca et al. (2008), also contain
detailed information on investment in equipment and structures.
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Figure 1.1: Quarterly Investment Rates
This figure shows the investment-capital ratios of nonresidential total (excluding intellectual
property and products), nonresidential equipment, and nonresidential structures over NIPA
sample 1947 Quarter 1 to 2015 Quarter 4. Investment data are from NIPA. Capital stocks





















Figure 1.2: Quarterly Cross-Correlations between Investment Growth Rates and TFP
Growth Rate
This figure shows quarterly lead-lag correlations between nonresidential investment growth
rates (in log) at t + i and TFP growth rate (in log) at t over NIPA sample 1947 Quarter
1 to 2015 Quarter 4. Investment data are from NIPA. Nonresidential investment excludes
intellectual property and products. Equipment is nonresidential equipment. Structures is
nonresidential structures. TFP data are from John Fernald’s website.


















Figure 1.3: Actual and Predicted 5-year Risk Premium
This figure shows the actual and predicted 5-year-ahead risk premium from 1947 Quarter
2 to 2011 Quarter 1. The predictor is equipment investment rate. “IS” means in sample.
“OOS” means out of sample. The out-of-sample procedure uses the first half of the sample
as the training period, and recursively predicts and retrains in subsequent periods. Shaded


















Figure 1.4: Model-Implied Investment and TFP Cross-Correlations
This figure shows the model-implied quarterly lead-lag correlations between investment
growth rates (in log) at t + i and TFP growth rate (in log) at t. The model scenarios
include Benchmark Model, Model 1 (same depreciation, δ̄e = δ̄s = 0.025), Model 2 (same
production share, αe = αs = 0.18), and Model 3 (no TTB, Je = Js = 1). Each model is





























Figure 1.5: Model Impulse Responses to TFP Shocks
This figure shows log deviations of model variables from stochastic steady states in response
to a one standard deviation TFP shock at time 1. All plotted responses are scaled by
the standard deviation of the TFP shock (1%). Model scenarios include the Benchmark
Model, Model 3 (no TTB, Je = Js = 1), and Model 6 (no habit, no adjustment cost,









































































Benchmark No TTB No Habit No Adj
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Table 1.1: Descriptive Statistics for Investment Rates
This table reports the descriptive statistics (mean (in percent), standard deviation (Std, in percent),
autocorrelation (AC(1)), and correlations) for US quarterly equipment and structures investment
rates at aggregate level, asset level, and industry level. Depreciation rates (Dep) for corresponding
capital types are also reported. The sample period is 1947Q1-2015Q4 for quarterly aggregate and
equipment-asset investment rates, 1959Q1-2015Q4 for quarterly structures-asset investment rates,
and 1947-2015 for annual industry investment rates.
Investment Rate (IK) Dep Mean Std AC(1)
Correlation with Aggregate
Nonresi. Equip. Struct.
Panel A: Quarterly Aggregate Investment Rates
Nonresidential 1.26 2.21 0.25 0.971 1.00 0.93 0.56
Equipment 2.72 3.88 0.49 0.965 0.93 1.00 0.26
Structures 0.79 1.35 0.25 0.988 0.56 0.26 1.00
Panel B: Quarterly Asset-Level Investment Rates
Equipment:
Information processing 3.11 5.69 0.95 0.969 0.87 0.81 0.52
Industrial 2.40 2.89 0.39 0.957 0.81 0.79 0.54
Transportation 3.28 4.05 0.73 0.923 0.65 0.74 0.25
Other 3.80 4.48 0.50 0.921 0.67 0.72 0.23
Structures:
Commercial and health care 0.64 1.34 0.39 0.988 0.59 0.35 0.88
Manufacturing 0.82 1.17 0.34 0.970 0.52 0.34 0.78
Power and communication 0.58 1.01 0.20 0.959 0.33 0.14 0.52
Mining exploration, shafts, & wells 1.91 2.15 0.69 0.952 0.21 0.03 0.31
Other structures 0.60 0.96 0.17 0.965 0.56 0.44 0.56
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Table 1.1 Continued
Investment Rate (IK) Dep Mean Std AC(1)
Correlation with Aggregate
Nonresi. Equip. Struct.
Panel C: Annual Industry-Level Investment Rates
Equipment:
Agriculture 14.39 15.92 3.44 0.851 0.12 0.28 -0.27
Mining 14.46 17.92 4.79 0.794 0.19 0.08 0.24
Construction 16.34 18.80 5.35 0.792 0.52 0.71 -0.14
Manufacturing 9.81 12.78 2.12 0.809 0.79 0.80 0.40
Wholesale 14.84 20.54 4.90 0.788 0.64 0.64 0.46
Retail 13.11 18.96 3.06 0.725 0.67 0.71 0.19
Transp & warehousing 8.93 11.27 2.48 0.730 0.67 0.81 0.01
Information 11.90 18.69 2.80 0.657 0.62 0.63 0.22
Profes, scient & techn serv 12.31 22.15 5.70 0.881 0.54 0.60 -0.08
Admin & waste manag serv 12.88 21.14 3.80 0.683 0.54 0.54 0.19
Health care & social assist 15.62 22.81 2.24 0.648 0.35 0.27 0.32
Arts, entert & recreation 14.53 18.81 4.18 0.845 0.33 0.49 -0.16
Accomodation & food serv 14.79 17.77 1.85 0.548 0.58 0.53 0.44
Other serv, except govern 12.96 17.89 4.00 0.783 0.34 0.29 0.23
Structures:
Agriculture 2.49 2.17 0.83 0.913 0.23 0.19 0.18
Mining 7.01 9.13 2.80 0.882 0.06 -0.21 0.49
Construction 2.75 7.96 5.05 0.886 0.17 -0.03 0.68
Manufacturing 3.22 4.36 1.40 0.853 0.55 0.39 0.76
Wholesale 2.63 7.93 3.60 0.790 0.24 -0.05 0.80
Retail 2.70 6.01 1.89 0.893 0.41 0.21 0.80
Transp & warehousing 2.23 2.98 0.75 0.837 0.15 0.24 -0.41
Information 2.58 5.66 1.45 0.882 0.71 0.49 0.75
Profes, scient & techn serv 2.70 9.06 3.73 0.852 0.11 -0.16 0.65
Admin & waste manag serv 2.48 6.33 2.88 0.899 0.26 0.00 0.74
Health care & social assist 2.18 7.59 3.58 0.940 -0.09 -0.31 0.63
Arts, entert & recreation 3.00 6.76 2.46 0.854 0.17 0.13 0.15
Accomodation & food serv 2.90 6.54 2.71 0.892 0.20 -0.01 0.69

























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 1.4: Return Predictability from Aggregate Investment Rates
This table reports in-sample and out-of-sample R2 (in percent) for OLS predictions of US aggregate
risk premium (from Kenneth French’s website) from 1947Q1 to 2015Q4 across various horizons (H)
ranging from 1 quarter to 20 quarters,
∑H
h=1Rt+h = a + b IKt + εt+H . Predictor variables are US
investment rates of nonresidential total (excluding intellectual property and products), nonresidential
equipment, and nonresidential structures. The out-of-sample procedure uses the first half of the
sample as the training period, then recursively tests and retrains in subsequent periods. b denotes
the prediction slope coefficient. p(NW) denotes in-sample p-values constructed as in Newey and
West (1987). Out-of-sample R2 is calculated against historical averages of the predicted variable.
ENC-NEW denotes the New Encompassing out-of-sample test statistic from Clark and McCracken
(2001), following the construction methodology described in Kelly and Pruitt (2013). Significance
for ENC-NEW statistics: ∗ ∗ ∗ : p < 0.01, ∗ ∗ : p < 0.05, ∗ : p < 0.1.
Investment Rates H
In Sample Out of Sample
R2% b p(NW ) R2% ENC-NEW
Nonresidential 1 3.90 -6.48 0.002 0.68 3.242∗∗∗
4 11.24 -22.55 0.001 6.31 4.414∗∗∗
8 18.45 -39.39 0.000 15.52 5.079∗∗∗
12 29.02 -57.63 0.000 26.68 7.170∗∗∗
16 38.08 -73.34 0.000 33.98 9.340∗∗∗
20 39.26 -85.80 0.000 26.99 8.931∗∗∗
Equipment 1 3.04 -2.93 0.005 -1.14 1.321∗
4 9.26 -10.45 0.003 1.10 2.196∗∗
8 15.52 -18.40 0.002 7.26 2.578∗∗
12 25.50 -27.38 0.000 18.48 4.351∗∗∗
16 35.16 -35.54 0.000 32.22 7.397∗∗∗
20 39.06 -42.57 0.000 34.73 9.520∗∗∗
Structures 1 0.97 -3.19 0.091 -2.55 0.462
4 2.42 -10.40 0.068 -6.47 0.099
8 3.99 -18.43 0.051 -12.22 0.179
12 6.44 -27.74 0.053 -26.44 0.326
16 8.46 -35.97 0.087 -50.93 0.328
20 7.83 -40.75 0.159 -87.25 0.063
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Table 1.5: Return Predictability from Aggregate Investment Rates with Time-Varying De-
preciation
This table reports in-sample and out-of-sample R2 (in percent) for OLS predictions of US aggregate
risk premium (from Kenneth French’s website) from 1953Q1 to 2015Q4 across various horizons (H)
ranging from 1 quarter to 20 quarters,
∑H
h=1Rt+h = a + b IKt + εt+H . Predictor variables are
US investment rates of nonresidential total (excluding intellectual property and products), nonres-
idential equipment, and nonresidential structures, constructed following Bachmann et al. (2013).
See Appendix A.2 for details. The out-of-sample procedure uses the first half of the sample as the
training period, then recursively tests and retrains in subsequent periods. b denotes the prediction
slope coefficient. p(NW) denotes in-sample p-values constructed as in Newey and West (1987). Out-
of-sample R2 is calculated against historical averages of the predicted variable. ENC-NEW denotes
the New Encompassing out-of-sample test statistic from Clark and McCracken (2001), following
the construction methodology described in Kelly and Pruitt (2013). Significance for ENC-NEW
statistics: ∗ ∗ ∗ : p < 0.01, ∗ ∗ : p < 0.05, ∗ : p < 0.1.
Investment Rates H
In Sample Out of Sample
R2% b p(NW ) R2% ENC-NEW
Nonresidential 1 2.26 -4.51 0.022 -2.24 1.323∗
4 6.45 -15.59 0.005 1.38 2.681∗∗
8 9.93 -26.12 0.003 8.68 2.544∗∗
12 17.15 -39.29 0.000 15.57 3.284∗∗∗
16 25.62 -52.25 0.000 22.53 4.163∗∗∗
20 27.74 -62.83 0.000 19.86 3.957∗∗∗
Equipment 1 2.26 -2.78 0.023 -1.84 0.693
4 6.15 -9.34 0.011 3.38 2.060∗∗
8 9.03 -15.17 0.013 8.67 1.679∗∗
12 17.14 -23.61 0.000 18.62 2.856∗∗
16 28.33 -32.49 0.000 34.72 5.598∗∗∗
20 32.71 -39.13 0.000 43.21 8.471∗∗∗
Structures 1 1.10 -3.77 0.081 -1.40 0.856
4 2.62 -11.95 0.072 -0.94 0.818
8 4.04 -20.08 0.051 -1.03 0.507
12 6.10 -28.39 0.076 -3.70 0.477
16 7.46 -34.31 0.149 -10.97 0.343
20 5.74 -34.85 0.272 -33.87 -0.248
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Table 1.6: Return Predictability from Asset-Level Investment Rates
This table reports in-sample and out-of-sample R2 (in percent) for OLS predictions of US aggregate
risk premium (from Kenneth French’s website) from 1947Q1 to 2015Q4 across various horizons (H)
ranging from 4 quarters to 20 quarters,
∑H
h=1Rt+h = a+ b IKt + εt+H . Predictor variables are US
investment rates of different types of nonresidential equipment and nonresidential structures. The
out-of-sample procedure uses the first half of the sample as the training period, then recursively tests
and retrains in subsequent periods. b denotes the prediction slope coefficient. p(NW) denotes in-
sample p-values constructed as in Newey and West (1987). Out-of-sample R2 is calculated against
historical averages of the predicted variable. ENC-NEW denotes the New Encompassing out-of-
sample test statistic from Clark and McCracken (2001), following the construction methodology
described in Kelly and Pruitt (2013). Significance for ENC-NEW statistics: ∗ ∗ ∗ : p < 0.01, ∗ ∗ :
p < 0.05, ∗ : p < 0.1.
Investment Rates H
In Sample Out of Sample
R2% b p(NW ) R2% ENC-NEW
Panel A: Equipment
Information 4 6.41 -4.54 0.006 0.21 1.770∗∗
processing 12 18.88 -12.69 0.001 0.98 2.128∗∗
20 28.25 -20.07 0.000 -36.63 1.576∗
Industrial 4 6.51 -11.00 0.007 1.56 1.303∗
12 18.85 -29.58 0.000 10.55 2.066∗∗
20 34.05 -49.91 0.000 17.37 3.489∗∗∗
Transportation 4 4.58 -5.02 0.015 -6.38 0.607
12 13.91 -14.05 0.000 3.11 2.195∗∗
20 24.66 -23.49 0.000 19.76 5.199∗∗∗
Other 4 8.22 -9.68 0.004 0.25 2.552∗∗
12 21.15 -24.57 0.000 20.25 4.751∗∗∗
20 35.60 -39.96 0.000 38.11 10.595∗∗∗
Panel B: Structures
Commercial and 4 2.91 -7.60 0.090 2.75 1.310∗
health care 12 8.31 -20.70 0.074 0.12 0.503
20 9.07 -28.47 0.166 -21.81 -0.037
Manufacturing 4 0.00 -0.30 0.947 -2.62 -0.474
12 0.57 -5.73 0.558 -5.19 -0.298
20 1.08 -9.56 0.544 -10.25 -0.136
Power and 4 9.55 -26.13 0.003 7.89 4.081
communication 12 12.01 -44.64 0.009 -5.02 1.332∗
20 6.69 -39.73 0.203 -13.02 1.089∗
Mining exploration, 4 0.02 0.31 0.908 -0.91 -0.170
shafts, and wells 12 0.84 3.49 0.449 -6.07 -0.350
20 1.58 5.73 0.330 -13.66 -0.451
Other 4 3.34 -19.01 0.038 4.48 1.390∗
12 8.98 -49.51 0.022 8.87 0.955
20 12.64 -77.20 0.016 11.01 1.086∗
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Table 1.7: Return Predictability from Industry Investment Rates at 5-year Horizon
This table reports in-sampleR2 (in percent) for OLS predictions of US aggregate risk premium (Panel
A) and of US 14 sectoral risk premium (Panel B) from 1962 to 2015 at a 5-year horizon,
∑5
h=1Rt+h =
a+b IKt+εt+5. Predictor variables are each industry’s investment rates of equipment and structures.
b denotes the prediction slope coefficient. p(NW) denotes in-sample p-values constructed as in Newey
and West (1987). The last column shows the difference in R2 between equipment and structures.
Industry
Equipment Structures ∆R2
R2% b p(NW ) R2% b p(NW ) E-S
Panel A: How Does Industry IK Predict Aggregate Risk Premium?
Agriculture 7.25 -3.12 0.031 1.99 -6.03 0.184 5.27
Mining 0.12 -0.26 0.770 5.09 2.81 0.174 -4.97
Construction 14.32 -2.48 0.005 4.74 -1.58 0.259 9.57
Manufacturing 17.90 -7.01 0.003 11.96 -8.77 0.087 5.94
Wholesale 19.94 -3.19 0.001 0.26 -0.52 0.758 19.68
Retail 17.52 -5.07 0.000 9.30 -6.91 0.046 8.22
Transp & warehousing 20.95 -6.75 0.000 0.50 3.45 0.733 20.45
Information 18.23 -5.41 0.002 16.11 -11.21 0.029 2.12
Profes, scient & techn serv 6.04 -1.59 0.058 0.15 -0.38 0.829 5.89
Admin & waste manag serv 6.53 -2.41 0.100 0.02 0.18 0.921 6.51
Health care & social assist 6.57 -4.35 0.048 0.00 0.04 0.986 6.57
Arts, entert & recreation 5.94 -2.07 0.078 0.15 -0.58 0.814 5.79
Accomodation & food serv 7.92 -5.43 0.002 2.42 -2.17 0.214 5.51
Other serv, except govern 7.58 -2.47 0.169 0.63 1.51 0.597 6.95
Panel B: How Does Industry IK Predict Industry Risk Premium?
Agriculture 0.76 -1.38 0.476 0.06 -1.34 0.796 0.71
Mining 9.67 -2.52 0.132 10.70 -4.88 0.049 -1.04
Construction 2.27 1.48 0.351 1.06 1.14 0.696 1.21
Manufacturing 13.60 -5.94 0.005 17.54 -8.92 0.021 -3.94
Wholesale 20.63 -3.41 0.019 6.13 -2.76 0.021 14.50
Retail 5.05 -3.24 0.184 14.72 -10.04 0.022 -9.66
Transp & warehousing 22.64 -6.33 0.001 1.04 4.60 0.639 21.60
Information 26.10 -7.70 0.000 8.10 -9.56 0.174 18.00
Profes, scient & techn serv 29.10 -4.49 0.000 3.36 -2.86 0.378 25.74
Admin & waste manag serv 12.63 -4.28 0.018 2.92 2.68 0.292 9.71
Health care & social assist 0.32 2.04 0.774 4.59 -5.09 0.444 -4.26
Arts, entert & recreation 1.23 1.75 0.407 0.47 2.05 0.714 0.77
Accomodation & food serv 5.58 -5.74 0.033 3.69 3.31 0.182 1.89
Other serv, except govern 1.55 -2.44 0.330 0.00 0.14 0.989 1.55
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Table 1.8: Return Predictability from UK Aggregate Investment Rates
This table reports in-sample and out-of-sample R2 (in percent) for OLS predictions of UK value-
weighted market returns from 1970Q1 to 2013Q4 across various horizons (H) ranging from 1 quarter
to 20 quarters,
∑H
h=1Rt+h = a + b IKt + εt+H . Predictor variables are UK quarterly investment
rates of nonresidential equipment and structures. See Appendix A.3 for more details on the data
construction. The out-of-sample procedure uses the first half of the sample as the training period,
then recursively tests and retrains in subsequent periods. b denotes the prediction slope coefficient.
p(NW) denotes in-sample p-values constructed as in Newey and West (1987). Out-of-sample R2
is calculated against historical averages of the predicted variable. ENC-NEW denotes the New
Encompassing out-of-sample test statistic from Clark and McCracken (2001), following the con-
struction methodology described in Kelly and Pruitt (2013). Significance for ENC-NEW statistics:
∗ ∗ ∗ : p < 0.01, ∗ ∗ : p < 0.05, ∗ : p < 0.1.
Investment Rates H
In Sample Out of Sample
R2% b p(NW ) R2% ENC-NEW
Nonresidential 1 0.67 -2.75 0.205 -0.06 0.182
4 3.70 -13.54 0.024 5.41 1.596∗∗
8 5.44 -21.50 0.041 8.55 1.201∗
12 10.49 -35.42 0.003 20.62 2.881∗∗
16 17.16 -48.23 0.000 36.59 6.287∗∗∗
20 23.94 -55.84 0.000 41.71 8.089∗∗∗
24 28.60 -59.02 0.000 46.97 8.094∗∗∗
Equipment 1 0.73 -1.90 0.178 -1.20 0.181
4 2.50 -7.38 0.032 0.90 0.975
8 2.38 -9.43 0.113 1.98 0.522
12 4.36 -15.16 0.074 6.00 1.219∗
16 11.12 -25.99 0.020 21.33 3.535∗∗∗
20 19.71 -35.20 0.005 30.53 4.749∗∗∗
24 23.46 -37.25 0.003 33.18 3.513∗∗∗
Structures 1 0.10 -1.23 0.682 -1.46 -0.443
4 1.66 -10.35 0.166 2.94 0.551
8 3.12 -18.56 0.091 2.88 0.345
12 6.32 -31.07 0.020 8.71 0.766
16 7.46 -35.57 0.001 13.46 1.109∗
20 8.66 -36.94 0.000 13.91 1.082∗


























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































This table reports the calibrated values of parameters in the model. The model is calibrated at
quarterly frequency.
Param Name Value
µ GDP growth rate 0.0048
ρa persistence of TFP 0.98
σa volatility of TFP shock 0.01
β time discount factor 0.995
γ risk aversion 2
ρs persistence of surplus consumption ratio 0.98
S̄ steady state surplus consumption ratio 0.07
δe depreciation rate of equipment 0.0338
δs depreciation rate of structures 0.0077
αe production share of equipment 0.202
αs production share of structures 0.158
νe equipment adjustment cost curvature 2
νs structures adjustment cost curvature 2
ηe equipment adjustment cost parameter 50
ηs structures adjustment cost parameter 50
Je quarters of TTB for equipment 1
Js quarters of TTB for structures 5
ωe equipment project completion pattern 1



















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 1.12: Return Predictability from Model-implied Investment Rates
This table reports model-implied in-sample R2 (in percent) and regression slopes β for OLS predic-
tions of aggregate risk premium, aggregate market return, and risk-free rate across various horizons
(H) ranging from 1 quarter to 20 quarters,
∑H
h=1Rt+h = a+ b IKt + εt+H . Predictor variables are
simulated equipment and structures investment rates. Note that model-implied investment rates are
generated using simulated investment data and the perpetual inventory method, as the investment
rates in the data are constructed. The model scenarios include Benchmark Model, Model 1 (same
depreciation, δ̄e = δ̄s = 0.025), Model 2 (same production share, αe = αs = 0.18), and Model 3 (no
TTB, Je = Js = 1).
H
Data
Model Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Predictive Benchmark Same δ Same α No TTB
Regressions δ̄ = 0.025 α = 0.18 J = 1
R2% b R2% b R2% b R2% b R2% b
Equipment 1 2.7 -2.8 7.2 -8.2 3.6 -4.3 8.6 -9.7 1.2 -1.7
Predicts 4 7.9 -9.8 20.9 -24.2 11.1 -13.4 24.6 -28.0 4.8 -6.6
Rm 12 21.0 -25.6 23.7 -30.0 17.9 -23.2 26.1 -32.2 13.1 -18.7
20 33.1 -41.4 27.9 -37.2 24.1 -32.5 29.8 -38.6 20.0 -29.4
Equipment 1 3.0 -2.9 0.6 -1.8 0.7 -1.6 0.6 -1.8 0.7 -1.1
Predicts 4 9.3 -10.4 2.1 -6.9 2.6 -6.0 2.0 -6.8 2.7 -4.4
Rm −Rf 12 25.5 -27.4 5.5 -19.2 7.0 -16.5 5.0 -19.2 7.6 -12.1
20 39.1 -42.6 8.8 -30.3 11.2 -25.8 8.0 -30.6 11.9 -18.7
Equipment 1 0.7 0.1 35.9 -6.4 30.7 -2.7 38.3 -7.9 35.4 -0.6
Predicts 4 2.0 0.7 32.9 -17.3 25.5 -7.5 35.9 -21.1 35.5 -2.3
Rf 12 2.5 1.8 5.9 -10.8 9.7 -6.7 6.0 -13.0 35.3 -6.6
20 0.5 1.2 4.0 -6.9 9.9 -6.7 3.7 -8.1 34.9 -10.6
Structures 1 0.6 -2.4 1.1 -3.6 1.2 -2.6 1.1 -4.0 1.5 -1.7
Predicts 4 1.2 -7.3 2.6 -9.0 3.5 -7.9 2.2 -9.4 5.6 -6.7
Rm 12 3.0 -19.5 9.2 -19.8 11.0 -19.3 8.1 -20.0 15.5 -18.8
20 3.7 -29.5 15.2 -29.1 17.2 -29.2 13.5 -29.1 23.6 -29.5
Structures 1 1.0 -3.2 0.8 -2.7 0.7 -1.8 0.9 -3.1 0.8 -1.2
Predicts 4 2.4 -10.4 3.2 -10.5 2.7 -6.9 3.3 -11.9 3.1 -4.5
Rm −Rf 12 6.4 -27.7 9.0 -29.3 7.7 -19.2 9.1 -33.3 8.8 -12.5
20 7.8 -40.8 13.8 -44.8 11.9 -29.4 13.9 -51.0 13.8 -19.4
Structures 1 6.1 0.8 1.0 -0.8 4.0 -0.9 0.8 -0.9 40.2 -0.6
Predicts 4 10.6 3.1 1.1 1.5 3.4 -1.0 1.1 2.5 40.3 -2.2
Rf 12 13.1 8.2 5.1 9.4 7.0 -0.1 5.5 13.2 39.8 -6.3
20 10.0 11.2 8.7 15.6 10.2 0.2 9.3 21.8 39.0 -10.1
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Table 1.13: Return Predictability from Model-Implied Planned Investment
This table reports model-implied in-sample R2 (in percent) and regression slopes β for OLS pre-
dictions of aggregate market return across various horizons ranging from 1 quarter to 20 quar-
ters. Predictor variables are simulated log growth rates of the structures investment decision
(log(Xst/Xs,t−1)), structures investment rate (Xst/Ks,t+4), and the ratio of structures investment
decision to structures investment expenditures (Xst/Ist).
Predictor Horizon R2% Slope p(NW )
log(Xst/Xs,t−1) 1 0.95 -0.07 0.314
4 9.80 -0.52 0.000
8 6.06 -0.43 0.002
12 5.37 -0.45 0.002
16 5.00 -0.46 0.001
20 4.60 -0.47 0.002
Xst/Ks,t+4 1 4.02 -6.26 0.014
4 12.39 -18.95 0.003
8 15.81 -22.83 0.008
12 19.92 -27.97 0.011
16 23.68 -32.84 0.015
20 26.89 -37.14 0.017
Xst/Ist 1 6.79 -0.23 0.003
4 25.13 -0.76 0.000
8 18.35 -0.69 0.000
12 16.54 -0.71 0.001
16 15.45 -0.74 0.002
20 14.54 -0.76 0.003
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Table 1.14: VAR Analysis: Discount Rates versus Cash Flows
This table reports model-implied results for VAR analysis along with the empirical counterparts.
Data are at annual frequency from 1947-2015. I use annual value-weighted CRSP market returns
with and without dividends to back out the dividend-price ratio and then dividend growth (see
Cochrane (2011) Appendix A). The model is simulated at quarterly frequency and aggregated to
annual frequency. Median statistics from 500 simulations are reported. All variables, namely return
(r), dividend growth (∆d), and dividend-price ratio (dp), are in logs. Panel A shows the regression
slope coefficient, p value, and R2 (in percent) for first-order VAR with dpt as the right-hand variable.
Panel B shows the long-run coefficients for long-run returns (rlrt ) and dividend growth (∆d
lr
t ) implied
from the 1-year coefficients in Panel A. ρ is calculated as exp(−E(dp))/(1 + exp(−E(dp))). Panel C
shows the variance components for dividend-price ratio both in raw value and in percentage of the
variance in the dividend-price ratio (var(dpt)). Due to the approximation error from Campell-Shiller
decomposition, the sum of coefficients on rlrt and −∆dlrt in Panel B approximately equals one, and
the percentages of variance components sum to approximately 100%.
Panel A: First-Order VAR
Data Model
Left-Hand Variable Coeff p R2% Coeff p R2%
rt+1 0.11 0.018 7.05 0.12 0.003 11.14
∆dt+1 0.02 0.608 0.55 -0.00 0.753 0.17
dpt+1 0.94 0.000 90.89 0.90 0.000 80.88
Panel B: Long-Run Coefficients Implied by First-Order VAR
Data Model









Panel C: Variance Decomposition for Dividend-Price Ratio
Data Model
Value Percent Value Percent
var(dpt) 0.1506 100.00 0.1391 100.00
var(rlrt ) 0.2435 161.67 0.1307 104.46
var(∆dlrt ) 0.0110 7.31 0.0005 0.35
−2 cov(rlrt ,∆dlrt ) -0.1035 -68.76 -0.0021 -2.58
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Chapter 2
Asset Pricing and Risk Sharing
with Limited Enforcement and
Heterogeneous Preferences
2.1 Introduction
When a risk-sharing contract between agents cannot be fully enforced, the agent can be
excluded from financial markets if he defaults on the contract (Kehoe and Levine (1993); Al-
varez and Jermann (2000)). Alvarez and Jermann (2001) show that this contracting friction
of limited enforcement generates limited risk sharing and a volatile pricing kernel, which
matches asset pricing moments decently. The two preference parameters—risk aversion
and time discount factor—play important roles in determining the amount of risk shared
and the properties of the pricing kernel. A rise in the agent’s risk aversion will increase
the volatility of the pricing kernel directly, as risk aversion is the curvature parameter of
marginal utility. But at the same time, more risk will be shared and individual consumption
volatility decreases, resulting in a less volatile pricing kernel. Therefore, the overall effect is
ambiguous. The effect of the time discount factor is similar. A rise in agent’s time discount
factor results in higher pricing kernel directly; however, it also decreases the pricing kernel
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through more risk sharing. When agents have different levels of risk aversion and time dis-
count factors, how would risk sharing and the pricing kernel—and thus asset prices—change
in contrast to when agents have the same preferences? Will they share more or less risk?
Will the pricing kernel be lower or higher, less or more volatile? Will the equity premium
be smaller or larger?
To answer these questions, I introduce heterogeneity in risk aversion and time discount
factor into a two-agent endowment economy with enforcement constraints and aggregate
and idiosyncratic income risk (Alvarez and Jermann (2001)), and study the corresponding
implications for risk sharing and asset pricing.
First, I show that the relative time discount factor and the interaction between hetero-
geneous risk aversion and aggregate risk affect the evolution of the relative Pareto weight
(RPW) of agents over time. When neither agent’s enforcement constraint is binding, the
RPW of the more patient agent goes up, and the RPW of the less risk-averse agent increases
in booms and decreases in recessions. This is absent in Ligon et al. (2002), because in their
economy there is no aggregate risk and agents have the same time preference. Ligon et al.
prove that there exists an interval for the RPW to fall into for each state, and the RPW
takes only boundary values of these intervals in the long run if risk sharing is limited. When
heterogeneous preferences and aggregate risk are present, I show that the RPW takes not
only boundary values of those intervals as in Ligon et al., but also certain values inside
those intervals. In addition, the RPW does not go to zero or infinity—i.e., no agents die or
dominate in the long run, since enforcement constraints entitle the agents to the option of
autarky for all times, and agents can consume their non-zero endowment.
Next, I demonstrate that preference heterogeneity combined with limited enforcement
generates a positive equity premium in a two-state example with only idiosyncratic in-
come risk (i.e., no aggregate growth), while agents’ endowment shares are symmetrically
distributed. Enforcement constraints induce discount rate shocks as the marginal pricer
changes over time, depending on which agent is not constrained. When agents have sym-
metric endowment and the same preference parameters, the pricing kernel or stochastic
discount factor (SDF) is also symmetric across agents. Although the marginal pricing agent
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is changing, the conditional SDF does not vary. Thus there is no time variation in price-
dividend ratios, and the equity premium is zero. Introducing heterogeneous preferences
breaks down the symmetry of the SDF across agents. The conditional SDF varies, depend-
ing on which agent is the marginal pricer, which results in time-varying price-dividend ratios
and positive equity premium. In contrast to homogeneous risk aversion, the amount of risk
sharing increases little for the low-risk-aversion agent, but decreases dramatically for the
high-risk-aversion agent, leading to high consumption volatility for the latter. When the
more risk-averse agent is unconstrained and becomes the marginal pricer, the SDF is large
and volatile, resulting in a sizable equity premium. As for the case of heterogeneous time
preference, the more patient agent has a greater chance to be the marginal pricer due to his
higher patience level, even though the two agents have symmetric endowment distributions.
As a result, the SDF is more affected by the more patient agent. When he cannot trade
away most of his income risk with the less patient agent, equity premium is high.
Last, I use the recursive Lagrangian method of Marcet and Marimon (2016) to solve a
calibrated model with both idiosyncratic and aggregate risk. As the intuition of the two-
state example carries through, I show that heterogeneous preferences generate asymmetric
risk sharing across agents and lead to a higher and more volatile equity premium than ho-
mogeneous preferences when agents are subjected to enforcement constraints. Undesirably,
the risk-free rate could be too volatile, because the discount rate shocks induced by en-
forcement constraints become asymmetric with preference heterogeneity and lead to more
variable SDF1. In addition, heterogeneous time preference shows more promise than hetero-
geneous risk aversion for better matching asset pricing moments. In particular, the former
could generate 7.05% mean equity premium and 27.87% equity volatility, with moderate
risk aversion around 3 and reasonable heterogeneous time discount factors 0.85 and 0.75 for
the two agents.
The paper’s contribution to asset pricing literature is to show that idiosyncratic income
1I use CRRA (constant relative risk aversion) utility. Heterogeneous risk aversion implies heterogeneous
EIS (elasticity of intertemporal substitution). The problem might be solved by Epstein-Zin preference, which
separates EIS and relative risk aversion so that agents can have heterogeneous risk aversion, but the same
EIS at the same time. I do not pursue it here, however, because of the associated computational difficulties
for the combination of Epstein-Zin and enforcement constraints.
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risk and incomplete markets become more relevant for asset prices when agents have het-
erogeneous preferences2. Alvarez and Jermann (2001) and Krueger and Lustig (2010) show
that idiosyncratic income risk does not affect (multiplicative) equity premium if its distri-
bution is independent of aggregate risk and aggregate risk is i.i.d. over time. I show that
preference heterogeneity renders discount rate shocks asymmetric across agents induced by
enforcement constraints, leading to time variation in conditional SDF and price-dividend
ratios, and thus non-zero equity premium even without any aggregate risk. Quantitatively,
heterogeneous time preference is better than homogeneous preference at matching asset
pricing moments when aggregate risk is present3. As for the paper’s contribution to risk
sharing literature, I generalize the theoretical result of Ligon et al. (2002) on the evolution
of the RPW over time under limited enforcement to include preference heterogeneity and
aggregate risk. In particular, I show that the relative time discount factor and the interac-
tion between heterogeneous risk aversion and aggregate uncertainty affect the evolution of
the RPW.
The paper is related to several strands of literature. First, it is related to the literature
on heterogeneous preferences and asset prices. For early contributions, see Dumas (1989)
and Wang (1996). The two papers, along with Basak and Cuoco (1998), draw an undesirable
implication: with positive growth, less risk-averse agents will dominate the economy in the
long run. To ensure stationarity, the literature has introduced habit into preferences (Chan
and Kogan (2002), Xiouros and Zapatero (2010), and Bhamra and Uppal (2014)) or over-
lapping generations with agents vanishing each period (Gomes and Michaelides (2008) and
Gârleanu and Panageas (2015))4,5. In this paper, enforcement constraints naturally emerge
as a device to ensure stationary long-run distribution, as agents always have the option to
choose autarky and would not end up with zero consumption. In addition, the papers cited
2See Cochrane (2017) for an overview of macro asset pricing literature. For widely used asset pricing
models, see Campbell and Cochrane’s (1999) external habit model, Bansal and Yaron’s (2004) long run risk
model, and Barro’s (2006) rare disaster model.
3Albuquerque et al. (2015) show that a representative agent model with exogenous time preference shocks
accounts for key asset pricing moments. I interpret time preference shocks in my model as endogenously
driven by enforcement constraints, as the marginal pricing agent who is not constrained varies over time.
4For other contributions, see Guvenen (2009), Chabakauri (2015), Coen-Pirani (2004), Kogan et al.
(2007), Longstaff and Wang (2012), and Lengwiler (2005).
5There is also a literature on heterogeneous beliefs and asset prices. Borovika (2016) shows that when
agents have heterogeneous beliefs, Duffie-Epstein-Zin preferences lead to long-run outcomes in which both
agents survive or more incorrect agents dominate. See the paper’s references for heterogeneous beliefs.
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above examine how heterogeneous preferences affect asset prices with only aggregate risk6.
In contrast, I include both aggregate risk and idiosyncratic risk and show explicitly how the
two risks and preference heterogeneity are intertwined through the evolution of the RPW
to determine consumption allocations, risk sharing, and asset prices.
Second, the paper relates to the contracting friction of limited enforcement. For early
contributions, see Kehoe and Levine (1993), Kocherlakota (1996), and Alvarez and Jermann
(2000). Alvarez and Jermann (2001) study its implications for asset pricing. Krueger
et al. (2008) test the SDF generated from limited enforcement and find support in U.S.
consumption data. Beker and Espino (2015) incorporate heterogeneous beliefs into Alvarez
and Jermann (2001) to explain return momentum and reversals. I also build on Alvarez
and Jermann (2001) and examine how preference heterogeneity affects risk sharing and
asset prices. Chien and Lustig (2010) show that less risk sharing can be sustained by
allowing agents to file for bankruptcy instead of excluding them from financial markets
forever, and this improves the asset pricing predictions. Ai and Bhandari (2016) study the
asset pricing implications of uninsurable tail risk in labor productivities when markets are
endogenously incomplete due to principal-side limited commitment. Cao (2014) shows that
agents with incorrect beliefs survive by holding on to their nonfinancial wealth under limited
commitment. For risk-sharing implications, Ligon et al. (2002) find some support for limited
enforcement using Indian village consumption data. Laczó (2015) introduces preference
heterogeneity into Ligon et al. (2002) and finds evidence for heterogeneous preferences using
Indian village consumption data and structural estimation7. Krueger and Perri (2006)
study the implications of limited enforcement for consumption inequality. Rampini and
Viswanathan (2016) show that limited enforcement can explain a household’s insurance
pattern. In addition, see Kehoe and Perri (2002) for an international application.
The paper is also related to the literature on how incomplete markets and portfolio
constraints affect asset prices. Mankiw (1986) and Constantinides and Duffie (1996) show
that equity premium will increase if the cross-sectional volatility of non-tradable idiosyn-
cratic risk is higher in recessions8. The main difference is that in my model the markets
6Gomes and Michaelides (2008) is an exception.
7There is no aggregate risk in Laczó’s model. And her focus is risk sharing; I study asset prices as well.
8For other early contributions, see He and Modest (1995), Luttmer (1996), Telmer (1993), Heaton and
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are endogenous incomplete due to endogenous solvency constraints, while the literature
usually assumes exogenous incomplete markets due to limited securities to trade, trade
frictions, or exogenous borrowing constraints, etc. Storesletten et al. (2007) extend the
endowment economy of Constantinides and Duffie (1996) to overlapping generations, along
with capital accumulation. They show that idiosyncratic risk inhibits the intergenerational
sharing of aggregate risk, but capital accumulation mitigates it by providing self-insurance.
Chabakauri (2013) finds that tighter margins and leverage constraints generate higher risk
premia. Rytchkov (2014) finds that state-dependent and time-varying margin constraints
reduce risk-free rate, but increase risk premium.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 outlines the model. Section 3 uses a two-state
example to gain the intuition of the model. Section 4 presents calibration and quantitative
results, and Section 5 concludes.
2.2 Model
In this section, I outline the model. I first adopt the promised utility approach to formulate
the contracting problem, derive the evolution of the RPW, and show its long-run properties.
I then use the recursive Lagrangian method of Marcet and Marimon (2016) (see also Kehoe
and Perri (2002)) to set up the planner’s problem and present a computation algorithm to
solve the consumption allocations. Last, I decentralize the economy, following Alvarez and
Jermann (2000), and pin down the asset prices with the solved allocations.
2.2.1 Environment
Two agents are endowed with a random stream of income eit, i = 1, 2. Aggregate en-
dowment is et = e1t + e2t and grows over time gt+1 = et+1/et. Agents’ income share is
êit = eit/et. I assume that z = (g, ê) jointly follows a finite-state Markov process. I denote
zt = (z0, z1, z2, ..., zt) as the history up to t. Transition probabilities from t − 1 to t are
denoted as π(zt|zt−1).
Agents have CRRA utility, but may differ in the relative risk aversion coefficient and
Lucas (1996), and Zhang (1997).
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and lifetime utility is defined as





where cit is agent i’s consumption at time t, γi is the relative risk aversion coefficient, and βi
is the time discount factor. Contracts are not fully enforceable. If the agent defaults, he will
be excluded from financial markets forever and remain in autarky. Agents’ consumption
choices satisfy the participation constraints,
U it (ci) ≥ U it (ei), i = 1, 2, t = 0, 1, 2, ...,
where U it (ei) is the utility value of autarky starting from time t. Note that for notational
convenience, I write out the states zt only when it is necessary to avoid confusion.
2.2.2 Promised Utility Formulation
I take the promised utility approach to formulate the contracting problem. Pareto frontiers
should satisfy






c1 + c2 ≤ e,





′|z)η2(z′) : w′(z′) ≥ U2(z′), z′ ∈ Z,
β1π(z
′|z)η1(z′) : V (w′(z′), z′) ≥ U1(z′), z′ ∈ Z,
where V is the lifetime utility of agent 1, w is the promised life-time utility to agent 2, λ is the
Lagrangian multiplier on the promise-keeping constraint, and ηi(z′) is the state-dependent
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Lagrangian multiplier on agent i’s participation constraints.










together with the envelope condition
−V ′(w, z) = λ.
There is aggregate growth in the economy. To obtain a stationary economy, I normalize
some variables as follows:
ĉit ≡ cit/et, êit ≡ eit/et,
ŵ ≡ w
e1−γ2
, V̂ (ŵ, z) ≡ V (w, z)
e1−γ1
,














The original recursive problem can then be rewritten as







ĉ1 + ĉ2 ≤ 1,






′|z)η̂2(z′) : ŵ′(z′) ≥ Û2(z′), z′ ∈ Z,
β̂1π̂1(z
′|z)η̂1(z′) : V̂ (ŵ′(z′), z′) ≥ Û1(z′), z′ ∈ Z,
where λ̂ and η̂i(z′) are Lagrangian multipliers on the constraints after normalization.
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together with the envelope condition
− V̂ ′(ŵ, z) = λ̂. (2.4)
It is easy to see from equations 2.1 and 2.2 that
λ̂ = λ/eγ2−γ1t .
λ̂ equals the marginal utility of consumption share, which is also the (normalized or preference-
adjusted) RPW (of agent 2 with respect to agent 1) in the planner’s problem, which will







The above equation describes how idiosyncratic risk, aggregate risk, and preference hetero-
geneity are intertwined to influence RPW and, thus, consumption allocations, risk sharing,
and asset prices. When agent i gets a high idiosyncratic income shock tomorrow, his partic-
ipation constraint binds, η̂i > 0, and his RPW rises. When both agents are not constrained,
η̂1 = η̂2 = 0, the RPW of the more patient agent will increase due to the term β2/β1, and
the RPW of the less risk-averse agent will rise in booms and decline in recessions due to
the term g(z′)γ1−γ2 .
9For convenience, I call λ̂ RPW hereafter.
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2.2.3 Risk Sharing
I characterize the evolution of λ̂ over time and its long-run properties.
Proposition 2. Suppose agents can have heterogeneous preferences. A constrained-efficient
contract can be characterized as follows: There exist S state-dependent intervals [
¯
λs, λ̄s],































Proof. The proof follows Ligon et al. (2002). First, there exist S state-dependent intervals
[
¯
Vs, V̄s] and [
¯
ws, w̄s] for agent 1’s and agent 2’s possible lifetime utility values, following







s . Second, let ¯
λs = −V̂ ′(
¯
ws)
and λ̄s = −V̂ ′(w̄s). Then considering the three cases





. Equation 2.5 then implies η̂2s > 0.
Thus ŵs =
¯










. Equation 2.5 then implies η̂1s > 0.
Thus V̂s =
¯
Vs and ŵs = w̄s. Hence λ̂t+1 = −V̂ ′(w̄s) = λ̄s.










Suppose the contrary, η̂2s > 0 and η̂
1
s = 0. Then ŵs = ¯
ws and λ̂t+1 =
¯
λs. But equation





. Contradiction. The symmetric argument holds for
η̂2s = 0 and η̂
1
s > 0. And it is not possible that η̂
2
s > 0 and η̂
1
s > 0.
Corollary 1. Suppose agents have the same preferences, i.e., β1 = β2, γ1 = γ2. Given λ̂t
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and next period occurring state s, λ̂t+1 updates as:
λ̂t+1 =

λs, if λ̂t < λs
λ̂t, if λ̂t ∈ [λs, λ̄s]
λ̄s, if λ̂t > λ̄s.
This is the same result as in Ligon et al. (2002). When there are no enforcement
constraints, the first best is achieved and λ̂ is constant over time, λ̂t+1 = λ̂t for all t. With
participation constraints present, next period λ̂ remains unchanged if possible, and changes
the minimum amount to be inside the interval of the possible values of (preference-adjusted)
RPW if this period λ̂ is outside the interval. When heterogeneous preferences are present,
the extra term gγ1−γ2s
β2
β1
shows up in the updating rule of λ̂.
Proposition 3. Assume agents have heterogeneous preferences.
(i) Both agents survive in the long run, i.e., limT→∞ λ̂T 6= 0 and limT→∞ λ̂T 6=∞.
(ii) There exists no constrained efficient contract that features constant consumption shares.
(ii) When the constrained efficient contract features limited risk sharing, the long-run ergodic
set of the RPW is several certain boundary λ̂s plus sets of other points inside λ̂ intervals.
Proof. (i) From Proposition 2, limT→∞ λ̂T ∈ [mins
¯
λs,maxs λ̄s]. Thus, limT→∞ λ̂T 6= 0 and
limT→∞ λ̂T 6=∞.





efficient contract achieves constant consumption under homogeneous preferences. From
Proposition 2, even if an overlapping interval exists, there is some positive probability that




. Hence there exists no constrained efficient contract that features constant con-
sumption shares.
(ii) From Corollary 1, limT→∞ λ̂T will only take values from {
¯
λs, λ̄s}Ss=1 when agents have
homogeneous preferences. From Proposition 2, limT→∞ λ̂T will take values not only from
{
¯
λs, λ̄s}Ss=1 but also inside [¯λs, λ̄s]
S





, when agents have hetero-
geneous preferences.
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2.2.4 Recursive Lagrangian Formulation
One difficulty inherent to computation associated with the promised utility approach is
finding the maximum promised utility w̄s for each state s, which is endogenous determined.
Thus I resort to the relatively manageable recursive Lagrangian approach—introducing the
RPW as the co-state variable—to compute the model solutions. The section on the promised
utility approach is retained to facilitate proofs for the evolution of the RPW.










U it (ci) ≥ U it (ei), i = 1, 2, t = 0, 1, 2, ...
c1t + c2t = et, t = 0, 1, 2, ...
I follow Marcet and Marimon (2016) (see also Kehoe and Perri (2002)) and use a recursive
Lagrangian formulation to solve the problem. Let the Lagrange multiplier on the enforce-












i(cit+j)− U it (ei)
 .










i(cit)− µitU it (ei)
]
Hit = Hit−1 + µit
Hi,−1 = φi,
where Hit is the time-varying Pareto weight for agent i at t and it equals the sum of initial



































When agent i’s enforcement constraint binds, νit > 0, his RPW goes up. When both agents
are not constrained, νit = 0 i = 1, 2, the more patient (higher β) agent has an increase in
his RPW.
Definition 1. Given initial Pareto weights φi, constrained efficient allocations for the
growth economy are {c1, c2, ν1, ν2, λ}, which satisfy equations (2.6), (2.7), complementary















νit ≥ 0, νit
[
U it (ci)− U it (ei)
]
= 0, (2.8)
c1t + c2t = et. (2.9)
To obtain a stationary economy, I normalize some variables as follows:
ĉit ≡ cit/et, êit ≡ eit/et,
λ̂t ≡ λt/eγ2−γ1t , λ̂−1 ≡ λ−1, (e−1 ≡ 1)
Û it (ĉi) ≡
U it (ci)
e1−γit














Definition 2. Given the initial Pareto weights φi, constrained efficient allocations for the
stationary economy are {ĉ1, ĉ2, ν1, ν2, λ̂}, which satisfy equations (2.10), (2.11), complemen-

















νit ≥ 0, νit
[
Û it (ĉi)− Û it (êi)
]
= 0, (2.12)
ĉ1t + ĉ2t = 1. (2.13)
It is easy to derive the equivalence between the growth economy and stationary economy
using the redefined variables. The recursive Lagrangian formulation is consistent with the
promised utility formulation. In particular, λ̂, the normalized RPW in (2.11), is exactly
the marginal utility ratio of consumption share in (2.5). One difference is that λ̂ is implied
by the envelope condition in the promised utility formulation, while it is a state variable in
the recursive Lagrangian formulation.
2.2.5 Computation
Denote state variables x = {λ̂, z}, where z is the joint Markov process of idiosyncratic
uncertainty and aggregate uncertainty, and the added co-state variable λ̂ is the RPW of
agent 2 wrt. agent 1. Denote the set of policy functions and value functions as F (x) =
{ĉi(x), λ̂′(x), νi(x),Wi(x)}, i = 1, 2, where





The computation algorithm follows several steps:
1. Set up a grid X over the state space.
2. Set the full risk-sharing solution as the initial guess F 0(x).
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3. For each x ∈ X, guess that neither enforcement constraint binds.
3a. If satisfied, set the new policies and value functions F 1(x) to be F 0(x)
3b. If agent 1’s or agent 2’s constraint is not satisfied, impose the binding
constraint and recalculate the solution as F 1(x).
4. Iterate until |Fn(x)− Fn−1(x)| < ε.
Linear interpolation is used for states not on the grid points. See Appendix B.1 for more
details.
2.2.6 Decentralization and Asset Prices
I follow Alvarez and Jermann (2000) to decentralize the economy10.
Definition 3. A competitive equilibrium with solvency constraints {Bi} that is not
too tight for initial conditions {ai,0} has quantities {ai} and prices {q} s.t.

























t+1)q(zt+1|zt) = ei(zt) + ai(zt),
ai(z
t+1) ≥ Bi(zt+1), (2.14)
where ai is agent i’s Arrow security holdings, q is the price of Arrow security, Bi is agent
i’s endogenous determined borrowing constraint, and Ji is agent i’s value function.









10Preference heterogeneity does not affect proofs for the welfare theorems.
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t+1) is the Lagrangian multiplier on the solvency constraint (2.14). Since the
two agents cannot have binding constraints at the same time, it follows that ζ1t+1 = 0 or
ζ2t+1 = 0 or both. Thus
qt(z










The agent whose solvency constraint is not binding has the highest intertemporal marginal
rate of substitution (IMRS) and prices the Arrow security at that state.
The asset pricing equation is
Et[Mt+1Rt+1] = 1,



















The risk-free rate is
Rf,t+1 = 1/Et[Mt+1]


























Pt is the price of aggregate consumption claim. And the equity premium is defined as
Re,t+1 = Rs,t+1 −Rf,t+1.
I use the solution of consumption allocations from the planner’s problem to pin down the
SDF, then the price-consumption ratio and asset returns.
2.3 Two-state Example
I introduce preference heterogeneity into the two-state example from Alvarez and Jermann
(2001)11. I show that it induces discount rate shocks, which—combined with the limited
risk sharing generated by enforcement constraints—generate a positive and volatile equity
premium with the absence of aggregate risk12.
Figure 2.1 compares the long-run consumption allocation under homogeneous risk aver-
sion with that under heterogeneous risk aversion, where agent 2 has a higher risk aversion
(2.7) than agent 1 (1.5). Agents have the same time discount factor, which is fixed at
β = 0.65. With the same risk aversion, the two agents have symmetric consumption shares
because transition probability and endowment shares are symmetric. The upper solid line
shows the consumption share when the agent has a higher income share, while the lower
dashed line shows the consumption share for a lower income share. As risk aversion in-
creases, agents change from autarky to limited risk sharing to full risk sharing. The squares
(for agent 1) and diamonds (for agent 2) present a particular case in which agents have
different risk aversion parameters, i.e., γ1 = 1.5 and γ2 = 2.7. The more risk-averse agent 2
pays a premium to the less risk-averse agent 1 for insurance so that agent 2 consumes less
than agent 1 in both states (c1L > c2L and c1H > c2H). In addition, agent 1’s consumption
allocation deviates little from autarky if they have had the same low risk aversion of 1.5,
but much less risk is shared for agent 2 than when they have the same high risk aversion of



























12Without aggregate risk, the equity premium is essentially the term premium of a perpetual consol bond.
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2.7.
[Insert Figure 2.1 about here]
[Insert Figure 2.2 about here]
Figure 2.2 compares the long-run consumption allocation under homogeneous time dis-
count factor with that under heterogeneous time discount factor where agent 1 has a higher
patience level (0.7) than agent 1 (0.5). Agents have the same time risk aversion coefficient,
which is fixed at γ = 3.0. Similarly, the two agents have symmetric consumption shares
when they have the same patience level β. The upper solid (lower dashed) line shows the
consumption share when the agent has a higher (lower) income share. As β rises, agents
change from autarky to limited risk sharing to full risk sharing. The squares (for agent 2)
and diamonds (for agent 1) present a particular heterogeneous β case β1 = 0.7 and β2 = 0.5.
The more patient agent 1 pays a premium to the less patient agent 2 for insurance, so that
agent 1 consumes less than agent 2 in both states (c1L < c2L and c1H < c2H).
When agents have the same preference, there will be no risk premium because agents
are symmetric and there is no aggregate risk. Although the agent who prices the asset is
time-varying, the conditional SDF, and thus price-(aggregate) consumption ratio, do not
change due to the symmetry assumption. But when agents have heterogeneous preferences,
a positive risk premium instead results. Preference heterogeneity breaks the symmetry
of SDF and induces conditional variation in SDF, and thus in price-consumption ratio.
Therefore, preference heterogeneity generates asymmetric discount rate shocks and leads to
positive equity premium, even without aggregate risk.
[Insert Table 2.1 about here]
Table 2.1 dissects how heterogeneous preference produces a positive equity premium.
Panel A contrasts the case of heterogeneous γ with homogeneous γ while keeping β fixed
at 0.65. When agents have the same γ (1.5 or 2.7), there is no variation in conditional
SDF due to the symmetric transition probability matrix and symmetric endowment shares.
Thus the stock return equals the risk-free rate (Rs = Rf ) state by state, and there is no
equity premium. When agents have different γ, however, the symmetry in SDF breaks
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down. Especially for the transition from st = s2 to st+1 = s1, which is priced by the more
risk-averse agent 2, SDF is much higher because he has high consumption volatility and
higher risk aversion. This boosts the mean and volatility of SDF. Despite no aggregate risk,
conditional variation in SDF generates variation in the price-consumption ratio, resulting in
a positive equity premium. Panel B contrasts the case of heterogeneous β with homogeneous
β while keeping γ fixed at 3.0. The results are similar to those in Panel A. When agents have
the same β (0.7 or 0.5), there is no variation in conditional SDF. Thus Rs = Rf state by
state, and there is no equity premium. But when agents have different β, the symmetry in
SDF breaks down. Especially for the transition from st = s1 to st+1 = s2, which is priced by
the more patient agent 1, SDF is much higher due to high consumption volatility and higher
patience. In addition, agent 1 is also the marginal pricer for the transition from st = s2 to
st+1 = s2, as he has a larger IMRS (larger β and no consumption change for either agent).
Although aggregate risk is not present, conditional variation in SDF generates variation in
the price-consumption ratio and positive equity premium as a result.
2.4 Quantitative Results
2.4.1 Calibration
I assume that there are four states and agents are symmetric in their endowment processes.
I follow the high β annual calibration of Alvarez and Jermann (2001) with 10 moments
to pin down 10 parameters, including 2 aggregate growth rates, 2 idiosyncratic income
shares, 2 aggregate transition probabilities, and 4 idiosyncratic transition probabilities. See
Appendix B.2 for details. For preference parameters β and γ, I pick values around the
numbers used in Alvarez and Jermann (2001) (β = 0.78 and γ = 3.5). I simulate the model
1,000 times and 5,000 periods each time, with the first 500 periods burned out to obtain
the long-run distribution.
2.4.2 Heterogeneous Risk Aversion
Figure 2.3 shows how the degree of risk sharing measured by consumption volatility and
SDF change when agents have heterogeneous risk aversion γ, but the same time preference
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β. I compare the case in which both agents have the same risk aversion of 2.5 or 4 with the
case in which one agent has risk aversion γ1 = 2.5 and the other has γ2 = 4 for a range of
β. When β is small, risk sharing incentive is low. Agents stay in autarky and consumption
volatility is high. As β increases, the degree of risk sharing rises. When β becomes large
enough, agents achieve full risk sharing. The degree of risk sharing for the heterogeneous
risk aversion case lies between the case of both low risk aversion and the case of both high
risk aversion for most β. In particular, the amount of risk sharing does not increase much
for the less risk-averse agent 1, but decreases a fair amount for the more risk-averse agent 2,
compared with the case of homogeneous risk aversion. In addition, agent 2’s consumption
profile is more volatile than agent 1’s. Note that when β > 0.96, heterogeneous risk aversion
generates less risk sharing for both agents than homogeneous risk aversion. Even when β is
large enough, constant consumption shares (i.e., zero standard deviation for consumption
shares) cannot be achieved, as proved by Proposition 3.
[Insert Figure 2.3 about here]
The magnitude of β affects SDF through two opposing channels. On the one hand, higher
β leads to higher and more volatile SDF directly given individual consumption growth. On
the other hand, higher β induces more risk sharing, and thus lower consumption volatility,
reducing the size and volatility of SDF. When β is small, agents stay in autarky and only
the first effect is present. Therefore, the mean and volatility of SDF increase with β. As
β becomes larger, the second effect dominates and the mean and volatility of SDF decline
with β. For a range of moderate β, heterogeneous risk aversion generates higher and more
volatile SDF than homogeneous risk aversion. Specifically, when β is between 0.78 and
0.85, heterogeneous agents share limited risk, and the more risk-averse agent with volatile
consumption pushes up the mean and volatility of SDF in the states in which he is not
constrained and is the marginal pricer.
[Insert Figure 2.4 about here]
Figure 2.4 shows how the mean and volatility of asset returns change when agents have
heterogeneous risk aversion but the same time preference. The two effects of β on SDF
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are present inversely on the risk-free rate. The mean of Rf (E(Rf )) first declines and
then increases with β. But the volatility of Rf (σ(Rf )) declines all the way down. This is
because the direct effect of β on σ(Rf ) always dominates the indirect effect. When β lies
in between 0.78 and 0.85, limited risk is shared and heterogeneous risk aversion produces
lower E(Rf ) than homogeneous risk aversion. For most ranges of β, heterogeneity in risk
aversion generates higher equity premium and higher equity volatility, because the more
risk-averse agent 2 feels unsafe holding stocks in recessions when his income volatility is
higher and he cannot trade away most of his income risk with the less risk-averse agent 1.
In addition, σ(Rf ) is much higher when agents have different risk aversion. This results in
an overly volatile risk-free rate.
2.4.3 Heterogeneous Time Preference
Figure 2.5 shows how the degree of risk sharing and SDF change when agents have het-
erogeneous time preference but the same risk aversion. I compare the case in which both
agents have the same time preference β of 0.75 or 0.85 with the case in which agent 1 has
β of 0.85, while agent 2 has 0.75 for each γ. When γ is small, risk sharing incentive is low.
Agents stay in autarky and consumption volatility is high. As γ increases, the degree of risk
sharing rises. When γ becomes large enough, agents achieve full risk sharing. The degree of
risk sharing for the heterogeneous β case lies between the case of both low β and the case of
both high β for γ ∈ [3, 4.2]. Specifically, the amount of risk sharing does not increase much
for the less patient agent 2, but decreases a fair amount for the more patient agent 1, in
contrast to the corresponding case of homogeneous β. In addition, agent 2’s consumption
profile is more volatile than agent 1’s. Note that when γ > 4.7, the heterogeneous time
discount factor generates less risk sharing for both agents than homogeneous time discount
factors do. Even when γ is large enough, constant consumption shares cannot be achieved,
as proved by Proposition 3.
[Insert Figure 2.5 about here]
The magnitude of γ affects SDF through two opposing channels. On the one hand, higher
γ leads to higher and more volatile SDF directly given individual consumption growth. On
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the other hand, higher γ induces more risk sharing and thus smaller individual consumption
growth, reducing the size and volatility of SDF. When γ is small, agents stay in autarky
and only the first effect is present. Therefore, the mean and vol of SDF increase with γ. As
γ becomes larger, the second effect dominates and the mean and volatility of SDF decline
with γ. For most γ, heterogeneous β generates a higher mean of SDF, because the more
patient agent will price more states including all transitions with no state change st+1 = st,
and thus no consumption change. Yet the volatility of SDF for heterogeneous β is smaller
than for same low β when γ ∈ [2.9, 4.7], because agents have higher consumption volatility
in the latter case.
[Insert Figure 2.6 about here]
Despite the low SDF volatility, heterogeneous β produces a high and volatile equity
premium, as shown in Figure 2.6. There is a spike for mean equity premium E(Re) and
equity return volatility σ(Rs) at γ values where agents change from autarky to little risk
sharing. This is because when the more patient agent 1 receives a higher income share
(and thus is not constrained) and prices the assets, he requires a high compensation for
bearing risk, as little of his income risk can be traded away with the less patient agent 2.
The pattern of the mean risk-free rate E(Rf ) corresponds inversely with the mean of SDF
E(M). Heterogeneous β generates variation in conditional SDF, leading to an excessively
volatile risk-free rate when γ is large. As demonstrated by the two-state example, preference
heterogeneity in γ or β renders discount rate shocks asymmetric, generates conditional SDF
variation, and results in volatile asset returns.
2.4.4 Asset Pricing Moments
Table 2.2 presents the simulation moments for asset prices and consumption allocation.
Panels A and B show the effect of heterogeneous risk aversion and heterogeneous time
preference, respectively. For Panel A, β is chosen to match the mean of risk-free rate E(Rf )
as closely as possible after γ is chosen around the value 3.5 from Alvarez and Jermann
(2001). For Panel B, γ is chosen to match E(Rf ) as closely as possible after β is chosen
around the value 0.78 from Alvarez and Jermann (2001). Panel A shows that heterogeneity
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in γ (γ1 = 2.5, γ2 = 4.0) increases the mean equity premium and equity volatility, 4.11%
and 12.70%, respectively, in comparison with homogeneous low risk aversion (γ1 = γ2 =
2.5), 1.59% and 6.64%. But heterogeneous risk aversion does not necessarily improve over
homogeneous high risk aversion (γ1 = γ2 = 4.0), where equity premium is slightly higher
(4.52%) and equity volatility is slightly lower (10.74%) in the latter. In addition, the risk-free
rate is too volatile (10.93%). Panel B shows that heterogeneity in β (β1 = 0.85, β2 = 0.75)
does not necessarily increase SDF volatility, but produces a much higher equity premium
(7.05%) and more volatile equity returns (27.87%) than homogeneous β (3.99% and 9.94%
for β1 = β2 = 0.75 and 2.09% and 7.42% for β1 = β2 = 0.85). Moreover, risk-free rate
volatility rises little (6.96% vs. 6.14% and 4.08%), although it is already more volatile
than in the data (4.01%). Alvarez and Jermann (2001) matches the volatility of risk-
free rate 5.67% from Mehra and Prescott (1985). Given that I follow their calibration, the
heterogeneous β case shows much promise for better matching the mean and volatility of the
equity premium. That the risk-free rate is too volatile is because the main mechanism of the
model originates from the discount rate shocks induced by enforcement constraints, which
become asymmetric with the presence of preference heterogeneity. I mention a potential
remedy for this in footnote 2.1.
[Insert Table 2.2 about here]
[Insert Table 2.3 about here]
As proved by Alvarez and Jermann (2001) and Krueger and Lustig (2010), when the
distribution of idiosyncratic shocks is independent of aggregate shocks and aggregate shocks
are i.i.d. (in short, as independent risk), the consumption share ĉ does not depend on aggre-
gate uncertainty. Hence the term premium is zero and the multiplicative equity premium
is the same as in a representative agent economy. Table 2.3 shows that heterogeneous pref-
erences generate a positive term premium and higher equity premium than homogeneous
preferences when risk is independent13. Panel A shows the results for heterogeneous risk
aversion when β is fixed at 0.5. When agents have the same γ = 2.5 or 3.5, the term
13The risk aversion and time discount factor parameters are chosen for qualitative illustration, not to
match moments quantitatively.
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premium is zero and the multiplicative equity premium is small (less than 0.5%). But when
agents have different risk aversion (γ1 = 2.5 and γ2 = 3.5), the term premium becomes
0.72% and the multiplicative equity premium rises to 2.44%. But all returns become quite
volatile. Panel B shows the results for the case of heterogeneous time discount factor when
γ is fixed at 3.0. Similarly, when agents have the same β = 0.45 or 0.55, the term premium
is zero and the equity premium is small (less than 0.5%). But when agents have hetero-
geneous time preference (β1 = 0.55 and β2 = 0.45), a small difference in β(0.1) causes a
4.37% term premium and a 7.72% multiplicative equity premium. In addition, the returns
of equity and perpetual bond are much more volatile than the risk-free rate. In contrast
to the case of heterogeneous γ, heterogeneous β can generate a higher and more volatile
equity premium without inducing too much volatility in the risk-free rate.
[Insert Table 2.4 about here]
In the benchmark model, all agents’ income is labor income; agents are not endowed
with any assets at the beginning. I relax this assumption by letting the agents be endowed
with both labor income and half of a Lucas tree initially. The Lucas tree bears fruits
as dividend income, which is a constant fraction of total income, ω = Dt/et
14. The rest
1 − ω fraction of et is labor income, and the agents’ shares of labor income are subject to
idiosyncratic shocks, as in the benchmark model. In default, the Lucas tree will be seized
and the agents will consume only labor income in autarky. Table 2.4 shows how asset prices
change as ω varies from zero to 10%15. Asset prices are very sensitive to the magnitude of ω.
As it increases, autarky becomes less attractive and agents share more risk. The volatility
of consumption share and SDF decrease. The risk-free rate becomes much higher, while
the equity premium declines a lot, from 3.45% to 0.63%, 4.11% to 0.72%, and 7.05% to
2.59%, for homogeneous preferences, heterogeneous risk aversion, and heterogeneous time
discount factor, respectively. In order for limited enforcement to matter more for the equity
premium, I could alleviate the punishment for default, such as allowing agents to trade a
risk-free bond as in Krueger and Perri (2006), or allowing agents to come back to financial
14Other parameter values are not changed. The only difference, therefore, is that ω = 0 in the benchmark
model while it is positive here.
15Chien et al. (2012) calibrate the fraction of collateralizable income ω to be 10%.
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markets several years after defaulting. These less severe punishment mechanisms, instead
of permanent exclusion from financial markets, can reduce optimal risk sharing and increase
the equity premium16.
2.5 Conclusion
I introduce heterogeneous preferences (heterogeneity in risk aversion and time discount fac-
tor) to a two-agent endowment economy with enforcement constraints and aggregate and
idiosyncratic uncertainty (Alvarez and Jermann (2001)), and study the corresponding asset
pricing and risk sharing implications. I find that the relative time discount factor and the
interaction between heterogeneous risk aversion and aggregate uncertainty affect the evo-
lution of the relative Pareto weight of agents. I demonstrate that preference heterogeneity
can generate a positive equity premium with only idiosyncratic uncertainty present, since
the conditional pricing kernel is time-varying depending on which agent is the marginal
pricer. With the calibrated model, I show that preference heterogeneity boosts the mean
and volatility of the equity premium quantitatively, when the more risk-averse or the more
patient agent cannot trade away most of his income risk with the other agent. In particular,
heterogeneous time preference holds great promise for a better matching of key asset pricing
moments.
16Another way to boost the equity premium is to view equity as a levered aggregate consumption claim.
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Figure 2.1: Consumption Share in the Two-state Example: Homogeneous γ vs. Heteroge-
neous γ
This figure shows the long-run stationary consumption shares of agents 1 and 2 in the two-
state example. The horizontal axis denotes risk aversion and the vertical axis consumption
shares. The agents’ time discount factors are the same, and fixed at β = 0.65. The
upper solid (lower dashed) line depicts how the agent’s consumption share changes with
risk aversion when he receives a high (low) endowment realization under homogeneous risk
aversion (γ1 = γ2). The squares and diamonds present a particular case in which agents
have different risk aversion coefficients, i.e., γ1 = 1.5 and γ2 = 2.7. Squares denote the
consumption share of the less risk-averse agent 1 (γ1 = 1.5) when he receives a high (upper
square) or low (lower square) endowment realization. Diamonds are for the more risk-averse
agent 2 (γ2 = 2.7). c1L = 0.377, c1H = 0.628, c2L = 0.372, c2H = 0.623.



























































Figure 2.2: Consumption Share in the Two-state Example: Homogeneous β vs. Heteroge-
neous β
This figure shows the long-run stationary consumption shares of agents 1 and 2 in the
two-state example. The horizontal axis denotes time discount factor and the vertical axis
consumption shares. The agents’ risk aversion coefficients are the same, and fixed at γ = 3.0.
The upper solid (lower dashed) line depicts how the agent’s consumption share changes
with the time discount factor when he receives a high (low) endowment realization under
homogeneous time discount factor (β1 = β2). The squares and diamonds present a particular
case in which agents have different time discount factors, i.e., β1 = 0.7 and β2 = 0.5. Squares
denote the consumption share of the less patient agent 2 (β2 = 0.5) when he receives a high
(upper square) or low (lower square) endowment realization. Diamonds are for the more
patient agent 1 (β1 = 0.7). c1L = 0.422, c1H = 0.531, c2L = 0.469, c2H = 0.578.



























































Figure 2.3: Risk Sharing: Heterogeneous vs. Homogeneous Risk Aversion
This figure shows how agents’ consumption shares and the resulting SDF change with time
discount factor β. Agents have the same β, but may have different risk aversion coefficients
γ. The upper part of the figure presents the standard deviation of consumption shares,
which measures the degree of risk sharing. The diamond-marked line indicates that both
agents have the same risk aversion γ = 2.5, while the square-marked line the same γ = 4.0.
The other two lines present the case of heterogeneous risk aversion, γ1 = 2.5 (the dashed
line for agent 1) and γ2 = 4.0 (the solid line for agent 2). The more risk-averse agent 2
has less volatile consumption than the less risk-averse agent 1 when there is non-zero risk
sharing. The lower part of the figure presents the mean and standard deviation of SDF.
The diamond-marked (square-marked) line stands for homogeneous risk aversion γ = 2.5
(γ = 4.0), while the solid line stands for heterogeneous risk aversion γ1 = 2.5 and γ2 = 4.0.



































































































Figure 2.4: Asset Prices: Heterogeneous vs. Homogeneous Risk Aversion
This figure shows how the unconditional moments of the risk-free rate and equity returns
change with time discount factor β. Agents have the same β, but may have different risk
aversion coefficient γ. The diamond-marked (square-marked) line stands for homogeneous
risk aversion γ = 2.5 (γ = 4.0), while the solid line stands for heterogeneous risk aversion
γ1 = 2.5 and γ2 = 4.0.













































































































Figure 2.5: Risk Sharing: Heterogeneous vs. Homogeneous Time Discount Factor
This figure shows how agents’ consumption shares and the resulting SDF change with
risk aversion γ. Agents have the same γ, but may have different time discount factor
β. The upper part of the figure presents the standard deviation of consumption shares,
which measures the degree of risk sharing. The diamond-marked line indicates that both
agents have the same time discount factor β = 0.75, while the square-marked line the
same β = 0.85. The other two lines present the case of heterogeneous time discount factor
β1 = 0.85 (the dashed line for agent 1) and β2 = 0.75 (the solid line for agent 2). The more
patient agent 1 has less volatile consumption than the less patient agent 2 when there is
non-zero risk sharing. The lower part of the figure presents the mean and standard deviation
of SDF. The diamond-marked (square-marked) line stands for homogeneous time discount
factor β = 0.75 (β = 0.85), while the solid line stands for heterogeneous time discount
factor β1 = 0.85 and β2 = 0.75.


































































































Figure 2.6: Asset Prices: Heterogeneous vs. Homogeneous Time Discount Factor
This figure shows how the unconditional moments of the risk-free rate and equity returns
change with risk aversion γ. Agents have the same γ, but may have different time discount
factor β. The diamond-marked (square-marked) line stands for homogeneous time discount
factor β = 0.75 (β = 0.85), while the solid line stands for heterogeneous time discount
factor β1 = 0.75 and β2 = 0.85.









































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 2.2: Moments for Asset Pricing and Risk Sharing
This table presents the unconditional moments from the model simulations. The moments
are averaged across 1,000 simulations, each with 5,000 periods and the first 500 periods
burned. E(Rf ) (σ(Rf )) is the mean (volatility) of risk-free rate, E(Re) or E(Rs − Rf ) is
the mean of the equity premium, and σ(Rs) is the equity return volatility. Sharpe stands for
the Sharpe ratio, E(M) (σ(M)) is the mean (volatility) of SDF, and σ(ln(ĉi)) is the volatility
of agent i’s consumption share. U.S. data sample moments of market excess return, market
return volatility, and Sharpe ratio are from Bansal and Yaron (2004). Real risk-free rate
sample moments are from Chien and Lustig (2010) using a long sample (1928-2007). AJ
denotes the calibration and results from Alvarez and Jermann (2001). Panels A and B show
the effects of heterogeneous γ and heterogeneous β, respectively. The preference parameters
are chosen around the values from Alvarez and Jermann (2001). For the heterogeneous γ
(β) case, risk aversion coefficients are first chosen, and then time discount factor is chosen
to match E(Rf ) as closely as possible.
E(Rf ) E(Re) σ(Rf ) σ(Rs) Sharpe E(M) σ(M) σ(lnĉ1) σ(lnĉ2)
US 0.89 6.33 4.01 19.42 0.33
β = 0.78, γ = 3.5
AJ 0.80 3.41 5.56 9.22 0.37 1.00 1.15 0.276 0.276
β = 0.88, γ1 = γ2 = 2.5
Panel A: 1.19 1.59 3.40 6.64 0.24 0.99 0.66 0.278 0.278
γ1 = γ2 β = 0.72, γ1 = γ2 = 4.0
vs. 1.21 4.52 6.73 10.74 0.42 0.99 1.41 0.270 0.270
γ1 6= γ2 β = 0.81, γ1 = 2.5, γ2 = 4.0
0.82 4.11 10.93 12.70 0.32 1.00 1.11 0.270 0.277
γ = 3.75, β1 = β2 = 0.75
Panel B: 0.87 3.99 6.14 9.94 0.40 0.99 1.29 0.273 0.273
β1 = β2 γ = 2.85, β1 = β2 = 0.85
vs. 1.17 2.09 4.08 7.42 0.28 0.99 0.80 0.275 0.275
β1 6= β2 γ = 3.20, β1 = 0.85, β2 = 0.75















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 2.4: Moments under Positive Assets
This table shows the unconditional moments under positive collateral income. Moments
are averaged across 1,000 simulations, each with 5,000 periods and the first 500 periods
burned. ω is the share of dividend income as of total income, which is seizable in default.
E(Rf ) (σ(Rf )) is the mean (volatility) of the risk-free rate, E(Re) or E(Rs − Rf ) is the
mean of equity premium, and σ(Rs) is the equity return volatility. Sharpe stands for the
Sharpe ratio, and σ(ln(ĉi)) is the volatility of agent i’s consumption share. Panel A shows
the results under homogeneous preferences β = 0.78 and γ = 3.5, as in Alvarez and Jermann
(2001). Panel B shows the results under heterogeneous risk aversion β = 0.81, γ1 = 2.5
and γ2 = 4. Panel C shows the results under heterogeneous time discount factor γ = 3.2,
β1 = 0.85, and β2 = 0.75.
ω E(Rf ) E(Re) σ(Rf ) σ(Rs) Sharpe σ(lnĉ1) σ(lnĉ2)
Panel A: 0.00 0.77 3.45 5.56 9.31 0.37 0.28 0.28
β1 = β2, γ1 = γ2 0.01 13.93 2.17 4.70 8.18 0.27 0.21 0.21
β = 0.78 0.05 27.54 1.06 3.46 6.92 0.15 0.10 0.10
γ = 3.5 0.10 34.28 0.63 2.72 6.28 0.10 0.02 0.02
Panel B: 0.00 0.82 4.11 10.93 12.70 0.32 0.27 0.28
γ1 6= γ2 0.01 11.01 2.41 6.83 9.03 0.27 0.21 0.23
β = 0.81 0.05 22.37 0.98 3.64 6.75 0.15 0.12 0.14
γ1 = 2.5, γ2 = 4 0.10 27.85 0.72 3.02 6.47 0.11 0.06 0.08
Panel C: 0.00 1.12 7.05 6.96 27.87 0.25 0.27 0.28
β1 6= β2 0.01 8.43 4.65 8.45 12.32 0.38 0.23 0.25
γ = 3.2 0.05 17.59 3.35 8.40 11.38 0.29 0.17 0.21
β1 = 0.85, β2 = 0.75 0.10 21.42 2.59 7.93 10.83 0.24 0.14 0.19
96
References
Abel, Andrew B, 1990a, Asset prices under habit formation and catching up with the
joneses, American Economic Review 80, 38.
Abel, Andrew B, 1990b, Consumption and investment, Handbook of Monetary Economics
2, 725–778.
Abel, Andrew B, and Olivier J Blanchard, 1988, Investment and sales: Some empirical
evidence, in William A. Barnett, Ernst R. Berndt, and Halbert White, eds., Dynamic
Econometric Modelling , 269 – 296 (Cambridge University Press).
Ai, Hengjie, and Anmol Bhandari, 2016, Asset pricing with endogenously uninsurable tail
risks, Working Paper .
Ai, Hengjie, Mariano Massimiliano Croce, Anthony M Diercks, and Kai Li, 2017, News
shocks and production-based term structure of equity returns, Review of Financial Stud-
ies, forthcoming .
Ai, Hengjie, Mariano Massimiliano Croce, and Kai Li, 2013, Toward a quantitative general
equilibrium asset pricing model with intangible capital, Review of Financial Studies 26,
491–530.
Ai, Hengjie, and Dana Kiku, 2013, Growth to value: Option exercise and the cross section
of equity returns, Journal of Financial Economics 107, 325–349.
Albuquerque, Rui, Martin Eichenbaum, Victor Luo, and Sergio Rebelo, 2015, Valuation
risk and asset pricing, The Journal of Finance forthcoming.
97
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A.1 The Construction Length of Time
This section shows how construction length of time (LoT) statistics, as in Table 1.3, are constructed.
The Census Bureau surveys construction projects, including privately owned nonresidential construc-
tion, projects owned by state and local governments, and privately owned multi-family projects, and
tracks them from start to completion. It reports the LoT statistics as a supplement to the main
estimates of value of construction put in place. LoT statistics are calculated by value and type
of construction based on projects completed in a 2-year window. For example, the LoT for all
private nonresidential projects during 2014-15 would be the length of time for each project com-
pleted in 2014-151 weighted by its sampling rate. A sampling rate is assigned to each value-type
cell as the inverse of the probability of selecting a project with some adjustments. Sample rates
for private nonresidential construction projects are shown in Table 2 in Construction Methodology
of Construction Spending (https://www.census.gov/construction/c30/methodology.html). For
example, the sampling rate for manufacturing projects valued at $250,000 to $749,000 is 1/8. As
noted by Montgomery (1995), the “equal-weighted” LoT statistics without considering project costs
reported by the Census Bureau overstate smaller projects and understate larger projects, distort-
ing the aggregate statistics downward. Thus, I calculate a “value-weighted” version for the sample
2001-2015.
The numbers for 1990-91 in Column 2 of Table 1.3 are taken directly from Census Bureau
(1992), except that the row “All (value-weighted)” of 16.7 months is from Montgomery (1995). For
the sample 2001-2015, Census Bureau (2016) reports the equal-weighted length of time statistics by
1These projects could be started anytime before or during 2014-15.
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value and type of construction for each 2-year window, namely 2001-02, 2002-03,...,2013-14, 2014-
15. I calculate the value-weighted measures under some assumptions, since the microdata for each
project are not observable. Column 2001-15 shows the time-series average. To calculate the row “All
(value-weighted)” in Panel A, I assume the average value for each value category equals the midpoint
of the range, such as $2,000 (thousands) for the value category $1,000 - $2,999 (thousands). The
average value for $10,000 or more (thousands) is reported by the Census Bureau. I then weight each
value category by its average value and number of projects. I assume the distribution of projects to
be [1 2 4 8 16 32] for the six value categories (from highest to lowest).2 For example, the weight for
the value category $1,000 - $2,999 (thousands) is $2,000 (thousands) multiplied by 8. The value-
weighted length of time statistics for each 2-year window is then calculated as the weighted average
across the six value categories. To calculate value-weighted measures for each type of construction
in Panel B for 2001-2015, I weight across value categories with their midpoints multiplied by the
inverse of the sampling rates mentioned earlier.
A.2 Alternative Construction of Investment Rates
For completeness, this section shows how to calculate investment rates as in Bachmann et al. (2013).
I largely follow the description in their paper. Instead of assuming constant depreciation rates and
using the perpetual inventory method, I use information on capital stocks and depreciation from
BEA FA tables in addition to BEA NIPA tables. The data I use are (i) nominal investment from
NIPA Table 1.1.5 Gross Domestic Product at quarterly frequency, ĨQ, and annual frequency, ĨY ; (2)
investment deflators from NIPA Table 1.1.9 Implicit Price Deflators for Gross Domestic Product at
quarterly frequency, PQ; (3) nominal depreciation from FA Table 1.3. Current-Cost Depreciation of
Fixed Assets and Consumer Durable Goods at annual frequency, DY ; (4) nominal capital stock at
year-end prices from FA Table 1.1 Current-Cost Net Stock of Fixed Assets and Consumer Durable
Goods at annual frequency, K̃Y .
First, I construct a quarterly investment series consistent with annual investment. Because
original quarterly investment is seasonally adjusted at annual rates, the average in each year is not
equal to total annual investment. I use IQt = I
Y




Q, where y denotes which year.
Second, to obtain quarterly depreciation, I assume the real depreciation rate is constant across 4
2This is a simple yet reasonable assumption, based on the sampling rates across each value-type cell shown
in Table 2 in https://www.census.gov/construction/c30/methodology.html. See the previous paragraph.
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D1 +D2 +D3 +D4 = D
Y .





1,y+1). I use K
Y as quarter 4 capital stock and use a capital accumulation equation
















Quarterly UK investment data is downloaded from “gross fixed capital formation by 6 asset types”
(namq pi6 k) in the Eurostat database.3 The quantity index for base year 2000 is used, since it has
longest time series for the break between equipment and structures. The sample is from 1970Q1 to
2013Q4. Seasonally and calendar adjusted data are used. The 6 asset types are N1111 dwellings,
N1112 other buildings and structures, N11131 transport equipment, N11132 other machinery and
equipment, N1114 cultivated assets, and N112 intangible fixed assets, along with the aggregate N11
total fixed assets. N1112 is used as the US counterpart of nonresidential structures, and the sum of
N11131 and N11132 is taken as nonresidential equipment, which I denote as N1113.
I use the perpetual inventory method to calculate investment rates for equipment and structures,
as for US. To calculate the growth rate of total nonresidential equipment N1113, I use the nomi-
nal investment (not seasonally adjusted) weighted investment growth rates of N11131 and N11132
(year 2000 index). The depreciation rates used for N1112, N11131, and N11132 are 0.0203, 0.2059,
and 0.0757, which are annual and from Oulton and Srinivasan (2003), p.49, Table F ONS2 row.4
The depreciation rate for N1113 is calculated as the nominal investment (not seasonally adjusted)
weighted depreciation rates of N11131 and N11132, resulting in 0.1046.5
3These data are from the European system of national and regional accounts ESA95. There is an update
in September 2014 from ESA95 to ESA 2010, to be consistent with the international System of National
Accounts (SNA 2008). I use ESA95, because it has longer time series back to 1970s, while ESA 2010 starts
from 1995 for the UK.
4These numbers are fairly similar to US numbers.
5Ideally, capital stock weighted depreciation should be used. However, Eurostat has only annual capital
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Return data are from Kenneth French’s and John Campbell’s websites and IMF International
Financial Statistics.6 All returns are transformed to log. For nominal stock market return 1970Q1
to 2015Q4, the early sample 1970Q1 to 1974Q4 from Campbell is spliced with the later sample
1975Q1 to 2015Q4 from French.7 For the nominal 3-month risk-free rate and consumer price index
(CPI) from 1964Q1 to 2016Q4, Campbell’s data from 1964Q1 to 1996Q4 are directly extended to
2016Q4 using IMF’s IFS data, which is Campbell’s original source. Each quarter’s risk-free rate and
CPI are the 3 month Treasury bill yield and Consumer Price Index All items at the quarter-end
month, respectively.8 Realized inflation is the log change in CPI. Real stock return is the nominal
stock return minus realized inflation. The ex-post risk-free return is the nominal risk-free rate minus
realized inflation.
To obtain ex-ante real risk-free return, I follow the procedure of Beeler and Campbell (2012). I
regress the ex-post risk-free return on the risk-free rate (last quarter) and annual realized inflation
(divided by 4, last quarter) and use the predicted value as the ex-ante risk-free return.9 The risk
premium is defined as the real stock return minus either the ex-post risk-free return or ex-ante
risk-free return.
A.4 Firm Value Derivation
This section shows to how to derive firm value when there is TTB, as shown in equation (1.10). For
notational convenience, I denote
G(Ket, Xe,t−Je+1,Kst, Xs,t−Js+1) ≡ Ge(Ket, Xe,t−Je+1) +Gs(Kst, Xs,t−Js+1)
Π(Ket,Kst) ≡ Yt −WtLt.
stock data from 1995, which are derived assuming straight-line depreciation. The depreciation rates from
Oulton and Srinivasan (2003) are derived under the assumption of geometric depreciation. By any means,
the capital stock weighted depreciation for N1113 is 0.1024 or 0.097, if the 2005 chain-linked volume in




7Monthly value-weighted market return in local currency without requiring the four price ratios in
French’s data is first taken log and then summed to quarterly value. The two return series from Camp-
bell and French have a correlation of 0.9978 in the overlapping sample 1975Q1-1997Q1. Early Campbell
data 1970Q1-1974Q4 are scaled by the relative ratio of average return from French to average return from
Campbell in the overlapping sample.
8The IMF’s CPI has changed the base year to 2010. I scale the IMF data part 1997Q1-2016Q4 by the
relative ratio of Campbell CPI to IMF CPI at 1996Q4.
9The regression coefficients on the ex-ante risk-free rate and realized inflation are 0.82 and -0.77, re-
spectively. The only difference from Beeler and Campbell (2012) is that I run the regression at quarterly
frequency, while their regression is at monthly frequency.
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For further simplification, I will use G(t) and Π(t) to denote the above adjustment cost function and
revenue function. It is easy to show that both G(t) and Π(t) are homogeneous of degree one (HD1).
The expression for dividend Dt can then expressed as follows:
Dt =Π(t)− Iet − Ist −G(t)







−GKe(t)Ket −GKs(t)Kst −GXe(t)Xe,t−Je+1 −GXs(t)Xs,t−Js+1
− qet[Ke,t+1 − (1− δe)Ket −Xe,t−Je+1]













The discounted cum-dividend firm value Et−1(Mt−1,tVt) or Pt−1 can then be derived,
Et−1(Mt−1,tVt) = Et−1
{






qi,t−1Kit − qi,t−1Kit + Et−1
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− qitKi,t+1 + Et
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where Euler equations (1.9) are used in the derivation. In standard one-period TTB models, the
last two terms will vanish. And Pt−1 =
∑e,s
i qi,t−1Kit. Using the above equation, it follows
Et−Js+1(Mt−Js+1,tVt) = Et−Js+1 {Mt−Js+1,t−1Et−1[Mt−1,tVt]}




































































+ ...+ Et−Js+1 (Xe,t−1Mt−Js+1,t−1ω
e
1) ,
where marginal q equations (1.8) are used in the derivation. Finally, the expected stock price can
be derived as follows by shifting the above equation one period forward,
Et−Js+2(Mt−Js+2,tPt) = Et−Js+2[Mt−Js+2,tEt(Mt,t+1Vt+1)]
= Et−Js+2(Mt−Js+2,t+1Vt+1)














j ) + ...+ Et−Js+2(XetMt−Js+2,tω
e
1).
In my calibration, I assume Je = 1 and Js = 5. The price equation can be written as
Et−3(Mt−3,tPt)





















To better identify the effect of TFP on different types of investment, I estimate separately bivarate
VARs with TFP growth (ordered first) and different investment growth rates. Figure A.1 shows
the impulse responses (IRFs) of nonresidential equipment investment growth and nonresidential
structures investment growth to innovations in TFP growth. When TFP growth increases 1%,
118
equipment investment growth has the largest response on impact, increasing about 1.3%. From
quarter 5, it begins to decline and reverts back to steady state in about 20 quarters. The response
pattern of structures investment growth is different in the first 4 quarters: It increases about 0.6%
percent on impact and persists for 4 quarters. This suggests longer TTB for equipment investment
than structures investment.
To complement the results shown in Table 1.4, Table A.1 reports how components of gross
private fixed investment predict aggregate risk premium. The residential investment rate shows
moderate power for predicting returns. The IPP investment rate has little power to predict returns.
Table A.2 reports how components of government gross investment predict aggregate risk pre-
mium. The construction of government investment rates is similar to the construction of private
investment rates, as shown in Section 1.2.1. I use real government investment from NIPA Table
3.9.5 (in nominal value) deflated by NIPA Table 3.9.4 (price indices). I calculate government cap-
ital depreciation rates from the time series average of the ratio of real depreciation (FA Table 7.3
nominal value in base year 2009 multiplied by FA Table 7.4 chained quantity indexes) to last-year-
end capital stock (FA Table 7.1 nominal value in base year 2009 multiplied by FA Table 7.2 chained
quantity indexes). With real investment series and depreciation rates, I use the perpetual inven-
tory method in equation (1.1) to calculate government investment rates. Government investment,
especially equipment investment, shows positive prediction for stock returns.
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Figure A.1: Impulse Response Functions (IRFs) of Investment Growth to TFP Growth
Innovation
This figure shows the impulse responses of nonresidential equipment investment growth (left
panel) and nonresidential structures investment growth (right panel) to innovations in TFP
growth, generated by separately estimating bivariate VARs with TFP growth (ordered first)
and different investment growth rates. Shaded areas are one standard error confidence bands
from Kilian’s (1998) bootstrap-after-bootstrap. The sample period is 1947Q1-2015Q4.









































Table A.1: Return Predictability from Private Investment
This table reports in-sample and out-of-sample R2 (in percent) for OLS predictions of US aggregate
risk premium (from Kenneth French’s website) from 1947Q1 to 2015Q4 across various horizons (H)
ranging from 1 quarter to 20 quarters,
∑H
h=1Rt+h = a + b IKt + εt+H . Predictor variables are
US investment rates of nonresidential total (including intellectual property and products (IPP)),
nonresidential IPP, residential, and gross private fixed including both nonresidential and residential.
The out-of-sample procedure uses the first half of the sample as the training period, then recursively
tests and retrains in subsequent periods. b denotes the prediction slope coefficient. p(NW) denotes
in-sample p-values constructed as in Newey and West (1987). Out-of-sample R2 is calculated against
historical averages of the predicted variable. ENC-NEW denotes the New Encompassing out-of-
sample test statistic from Clark and McCracken (2001), following the construction methodology
described in Kelly and Pruitt (2013). Significance for ENC-NEW statistics: ∗ ∗ ∗ : p < 0.01, ∗ ∗ :
p < 0.05, ∗ : p < 0.1.
Investment Rates H
In Sample Out of Sample
R2% b p(NW ) R2% ENC-NEW
Nonresidential 1 3.76 -6.40 0.002 0.32 2.833∗∗
including IPP 4 11.04 -22.48 0.001 5.38 3.961∗∗∗
8 18.60 -39.84 0.000 14.97 4.815∗∗∗
12 29.76 -58.89 0.000 27.80 7.341∗∗∗
16 39.29 -75.32 0.000 36.12 9.877∗∗∗
20 41.21 -88.82 0.000 29.70 9.621∗∗∗
IPP 1 0.13 -0.59 0.548 -0.39 -0.235
4 0.74 -2.93 0.364 -0.41 -0.049
8 1.34 -5.44 0.423 -1.49 -0.157
12 3.27 -10.07 0.290 0.38 0.118
16 5.76 -15.10 0.178 4.01 0.517
20 6.43 -18.54 0.170 4.84 0.618
Residential 1 0.49 -2.35 0.250 -1.41 -0.167
4 2.54 -11.08 0.084 -5.46 0.353
8 6.14 -24.10 0.022 -0.92 1.822∗∗
12 11.40 -39.31 0.001 7.79 3.155∗∗
16 11.54 -45.67 0.001 19.03 3.245∗∗∗
20 11.78 -55.76 0.004 22.01 3.154∗∗
Gross Private 1 2.79 -6.84 0.009 -2.31 3.028∗∗
4 9.50 -26.05 0.001 -1.79 4.595∗∗∗
8 18.04 -49.58 0.000 8.46 6.415∗∗∗
12 31.07 -77.12 0.000 23.89 10.338∗∗∗
16 38.36 -97.31 0.000 40.03 15.220∗∗∗
20 41.29 -120.26 0.000 46.31 24.504∗∗∗
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Table A.2: Return Predictability from Government Investment
This table reports in-sample R2 (in percent) for OLS predictions of US aggregate risk premium
(from Kenneth French’s website) across various horizons (H) ranging from 1 quarter to 20 quarters,∑H
h=1Rt+h = a + b IKt + εt+H . Predictor variables are US investment rates from government,
including gross investment and its components, equipment, structures, and IPP. The whole sample
is 1947Q1-2015Q4. The sample in Jones and Tuzel (2013b) is 1958Q1-2009Q4. b denotes the
prediction slope coefficient. p(NW) denotes in-sample p-values constructed as in Newey and West
(1987).
Investment Rates H
Sample: 1947Q1-2015Q4 Sample: 1958Q1-2009Q4
R2% b p(NW ) R2% b p(NW )
Gross 1 0.70 0.91 0.079 0.07 1.42 0.706
4 2.77 3.73 0.070 0.31 5.82 0.613
8 6.41 7.79 0.028 0.35 7.99 0.669
12 10.42 11.62 0.005 0.14 5.65 0.805
16 12.70 14.27 0.004 0.05 3.52 0.884
20 13.14 16.52 0.003 0.00 0.50 0.985
Equipment 1 0.65 0.36 0.078 0.33 0.67 0.472
4 3.09 1.62 0.080 1.62 2.96 0.311
8 9.20 3.80 0.038 4.35 6.33 0.174
12 18.40 6.25 0.000 6.34 8.65 0.103
16 23.60 7.83 0.000 10.76 11.98 0.016
20 24.14 8.96 0.000 14.31 15.45 0.002
Structures 1 0.56 1.03 0.127 0.09 -2.86 0.634
4 1.77 3.75 0.141 0.42 -12.22 0.536
8 3.22 6.95 0.129 2.10 -34.95 0.173
12 4.69 9.85 0.117 4.43 -57.12 0.032
16 5.79 12.22 0.139 9.04 -86.29 0.001
20 6.31 14.56 0.153 13.11 -115.95 0.000
IPP 1 0.09 0.26 0.581 0.01 0.11 0.901
4 0.25 0.90 0.563 0.00 0.07 0.979
8 0.51 1.76 0.492 0.02 -0.52 0.919
12 0.57 2.17 0.549 0.20 -1.89 0.788
16 0.58 2.44 0.590 0.57 -3.35 0.690





Let state variables be x = (λ, z). The policy and value functions are ĉi(x), λ
′(x), νi(x),Wi(x), where
the value function





The computation algorithm follows these steps:
1. Set up a grid X over the state space.
2. Set the initial guess to be the solution to the planner’s problem without enforcement constraints.
ν0i (x) = 0, z
′0(x) = z, ĉ0i (x), and W
0
i (x) satisfy (2.10), (2.13) and (B.1).
3. Consider three possible binding patterns of enforcement constraints:
• Neither constraint binds
• Agent 1’s constraint binds
• Agent 2’s constraint binds
3.1 For each x ∈ X, compute allocations that assume neither constraint binds.
3.2 Then check
u(ĉ0i (x)) + βi(z)
∑
z′
π(z′|z)W 0i (x′) ≥ U i(êi(z)) for i = 1, 2. (B.2)
3.2.1 If (B.2) is satisfied for i = 1, 2, then set new policies
ν1i (x) = ν
0
i (x), λ








3.2.2 If (B.2) is satisfied for i = 2 but not i = 1, then set ν12(x) = 0,
solve ν11(x), λ
′1(x), ĉ11(x), and ĉ
1




π(z′|z)W 11 (x′) = U1(ê1(z)). (B.3)
Set W 11 (x) as the LHS (left-hand-side) of (B.3) and W
1
2 (x) as the LHS of (B.2).
3.2.3 If (B.2) is satisfied for i = 1 but not i = 2, then set ν11(x) = 0,
solve ν12(x), λ
′1(x), ĉ11(x), and ĉ
1




π(z′|z)W 12 (z′) = U2(ê2(z)). (B.4)
Set W 11 (x) as the LHS of (B.2) and W
1
2 (x) as the LHS of (B.4).
4.1 If the difference between (ν0i (x), λ
′0(x), ĉ0i (x),W
0





i (x)) is small
enough for each x ∈ X, then stop.
4.2 If not, then set the initial guess equal to the new set of policy, multiplier, and value functions.
Keep iterating until the value functions and policy functions converge.
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B.2 Calibration
The endowment process is





















The transition matrix is
pLLπLL pLH(1− πLL) (1− pLL)πLL (1− pLH)(1− πLL)
pHL(1− πHH) pHHπHH (1− pHL)(1− πHH) (1− pHH)πHH
(1− pLL)πLL (1− pLH)(1− πLL) pLLπLL pLH(1− πLL)
(1− pHL)(1− πHH) (1− pHH)πHH pHL(1− πHH) pHHπHH

Aggregate growth rate follows a Markov process, and the idiosyncratic income shares follow a
Markov process conditional on the aggregate transition. πLL (πHH) denotes the aggregate transition
probability from recession (boom) to recession (boom). pij denotes the idiosyncratic transition
probability of agents having the same relative status (higher or lower than the other agent) of
income share conditional on the aggregate state transition from i to j.
There are 10 parameters to be calibrated in addition to the preference parameters:
gL, gH , θ, η, πLL, πHH , pLL, pLH , pHL, pHH .
The calibrated parameters, following Alvarez and Jermann (2001), are in Table B.1.
The resulting endowment process is
State g ê2 ê1
1 0.9602 0.3562 0.6438
2 1.0402 0.3562 0.6438
3 0.9602 0.6438 0.3562
4 1.0402 0.6438 0.3562
And the resulting transition matrix is

0.1414 0.8200 0.0309 0.0077
0.2637 0.6820 0.0486 0.0057
0.0309 0.0077 0.1414 0.8200
0.0486 0.0057 0.2637 0.6820

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